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The First World War gave a paramount importance and 
a privileged position to the English Arabists which they 
had never enjoyed previously in the entire history of 
Britain's foreign policy towards the Arab world. In the 
beginning of the War their sole function was to spy and 
rouse people in rebellion against the Turks. But they assumed 
a new role after the Turks were defeated in the Arab Fertile 
Crescent. With their expertise and knowledge of Arab history 
and psychology they were needed, on the one hand>to help 
establish new administration in the newly occupied territo-
ries of Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia, and on, the 
other, they had to assist the foreign policy makers in the 
Whitehall in London. 
The process of Britain's foreign policy making, 
specially in the context of the then Fertile Crescent 
was complex. There were three important centres of powerj 
Delhi, Cairo and Baghdad. Often they had divergent opinions 
and the Whitehall had to take them all into account while 
formulating a policy regarding the Arab World. But, infact, 
it were the English Arabists who, on most occasions, 
prevailed upon the policy makers and persuaded them to 
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adopt a policy that, according to their vision and 
wisdom, was suitable to achieve the imperial aims of 
Britain. Among such Arabists T.E, Lawrence and Gertrude 
Bell were most prominent. With their •'•>".'.: tact and know-
ledge they influenced Britain's Arab policy more than 
anyone else. Moreover they were acclaimed as friends of 
Arabs, But in reality they were imperial agents and their 
friendly attitude towards the Arabs wasonly a matter of 
tact and policy. For in their view the best way to control 
the Arabs was to know and 'love' them. The 'love' in this 
context always meant a device to assure the people of the 
occupied lands that they were not being ruled by an alien 
race but by friends and well-wishers. 
Philby was a contemporary of T.E, Lawrence and 
Gertrude Bell though he lived longer than the formers. 
He was an outstanding Arabist, intelligent and hardworking 
but unfit from imperial point of view. For he was an opini-
onated person, a non-conformist and lacked the tact and 
poise of Lawrence and Miss Bell to cajole the men in power 
into doing as he nked or advised. As a result he could 
not achieve as much suceess as his two contemporaries, 
Lawrence and Bell could do, in his political and admini-
strative career. 
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But only a successful career is not necessarily 
worth a research. Infact the relevance of a personality, 
selected for a thorough study, should be sought in his 
outstanding contribution^intellectual or practical, to a 
particular branch of knowledge or any other field of 
activity whose influence on the world at large or in a 
particular region is either of paramount importance or at 
least of considerable significance in one or another way. 
But what makes a man prominent or insignificant is a 
difficult question to answer. Criteria may differ from 
person to person depending upon individual interest and 
bent of mind. It is possible that a man can be good or 
bad in the opinions of two persons. For instance in the 
opinion of the British imperialists and their supporters 
Philby was and continues to be an anathema but a champion 
of Arab independence in the eyes of the freedom loving 
people of the Arab world, 
Lawrence, Bell and Philby all have written extensi-
vely about the history, culture and psychology of the Arabs. 
But their aims were different. Lawrence and Miss Bell were 
committed imperial agents and their sole purpose in writing 
about the Arabs was to provide informations to the British 
colonialists in order to devise ways and means to strengthen 
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and prolong their imperial rule in the Arab world, 
Philby, however, was made of a different stuff. He was 
not an enemy of Great Britain but he envisaged a new role 
for her and urged her to act accordinglyo In his opinion 
imperialism had become out-fashioned, and , therefore, he 
proposed, in the interest of Britain, to abandon it and 
help the less advanced nations to achieve independence and 
stand firmly on their feet. He further opined that such 
a gesture of British Kindness would not be only humanita-
rian but it would also serve the British interest on a long 
term basis, 
Philby did not receive the same scholarly attention 
as Lawrence or Miss Bell did mainly owing to his anti-
imperialist views. But his contribution to Arab studies, 
in many respects, is more important than that of his two 
contemporaries. In the first place his area of interest 
is wider than that of the other two. Infact he has written 
on a variety of subjects which others have not even touched 
such as the Palestine problem, Arab unity and the history 
of the House of Saud etcetera. Second, he is mainly con-
cerned with the cultural and political aspirations of Arab 
people and has presented them faithfully in his writings. 
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His airn, unlike Lawrence and Bell, in knowing the Arabs 
was not to rule them. Infact, due to his life long associ-
ation with the Arabs, specially with Ibn Saud which ulti-
mately resulted in his conversion to islam, he was better 
placed than others to understand and write about the Arab 
aspirations for unity and their desire for independence of 
infidel colonial rule. Third, he showed courage and 
candour to criticise and condemn .the imperial policies 
and wrong doings of Great Britain, an outstanding contribu-
tion that we do not find in the works of his two contempo-
raries. Finally, he made a unique contribution by writing 
on the bad effect of oil riches on life and society in 
Saudi Arabia, a subject which again has not been discussed 
by Lawrence and Miss Bell, On the basis of the reasons 
stated above it can be safely asserted that Philby's works 
and ideas are worth a research. 
Biographical accounts of a personality are generally 
helpful in our understanding of his ideas. Often it happens 
that an event or incident of one's childhood or early 
youth later on becomes a major factor in determining his 
future attitude and in shaping his beliefs and thoughts 
accordingly. In the case of Philby, as we shall see later 
on, this is true to a great extent. 
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Philby was born in 1885 in Ceylon. He received his 
early education in relatively dinknown schools in England. 
But in 1898 he became a Queen's scholar by winning the 
prestigious Westminister Challenge, the scholarship test 
for admission to the famous Westminister School which is 
located in the majestic surrounding of the British Parlia-
ment and Westminister Abey, the two ancient monuments of 
universal fame which symbolize the centuries old tradition 
of coexistence between the Church and the Government in 
England. Philby's short-lived orthdoxy which made him, for 
the time being, an ardent supporter of Christianity and 
conservative British politics, was, infact, a gift of this 
impressive surrounding. Westminister has been known for 
its conservative ideals and traditions. 
At Westminister Philby acquired a few nice qualities 
which became his life-long companions: discipline and the 
habit of hard work. Both, discipline and hard work pay; 
indeed they paid at Westminister itself. Philby, always 
determined to top the list, scored good marks all the way 
in his class. However, unlike his friend, Donald Robertson, 
he could not excell in Greek classics and decided to take 
toinodern languages. He learnt French and German and accuired 
fluency in them in a short Span of time. It seems he had 
- Vll -
special aptitude for learning languages. In India he was 
able to learn many local vernaculars and languages including 
Urdu, Arabic and Persian without much difficulty. 
Along with excellence in education pbilby also 
excelled in the gamesfield. His regular good performance 
helped him become the Captain of the school cricket team 
in his final year. When he took the charge the team was 
in a disarray. He tried to restore to it some of hex pris-
tine vigour and discipline. His aim was honest but the method 
he adopted to fulfil it was faulty. That 'he meant to rule,' 
remarks Waterfield, 'with an iron hand and he had not the 
good sense to conceal it in a velvet glove,' As a result 
his tenure was marked by internal dissensions. This weakness 
of his character was to haunt him throughout his life. 
It was also at Westminister that Philby developed 
an attitude of disrespect for the townfolk. In his opinion 
the Queen's or the King's scholars were superior species 
and it was their duty to behave likewise in order to show 
to the townboys an example of 'high breeding and gentle-
manliness'. Philby's fascination with the desert Aarabs 
had its roots in Westminister, 
1. Monroe, Elzabeth, Philby of Arabia. London, 1973, P, 19. 
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After Westminister Philby joined Trinity college, 
Cambridge. The air of Cambridge, in his time, was filled 
with liberalism, even agnosticism and atheism. Anti imperial 
views were openly expressed. Intellectually philby was 
impressed by all these but practically he preferred to be 
a loyal servant of the British Empire. As a result he 
joined the Indian Civil Service in 1908, However, the 
Cambridge liberalism had an effect on him. He no longer 
believed in the so-called supremacy of whitemen and gradually 
became an anti-imperialist, a protagonist of the right 
to self-determination and above all a champion of Arab 
independence. 
Throughout his career Philby was bold and outspoken. 
He never hesitated from expressing his opinion even if.it 
went against his interest.For instance it was possible 
for him and certainly would have been in his interest to 
conform to, instead of opposing, the official British policy 
while he was serving in Mesopotamia and Transjordan, Had 
he done so, he would not have been forced to resign from 
the British Government and face economic hardship and other 
difficulties. Like wise it would not have been diificult 
for him to keep silence or not to criticise the Saudi 
regime in order to avoid the wrath of Saud who banished 
him from Saudi Arabia, though for a short period. These 
events have been discussed in detail elsewhere in this 
dissertation. 
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It would be appropriate to say a few words about 
the methodology I have applied to do this research work. 
Philby was a prolific writer and the range of his interests 
was immensely wide. 'His mind*, writes Elizabeth Monroe, 
'roved confidently over history and the classics, the litera-r 
ture of several modern languages, archaeology and the sciences, 
politics, economics, finance, geology and the animal kingdom.' 
However, the scope of this research is limited and deals 
only with his perception of Islam and the Arabs. 
Writing on Philby's perception of Islam and the 
Arabs is not an easy task. There is little critical work 
on him. His biography written by Elizabeth Monroe, to the 
best of my knowledge, is the only valuable work that deals 
inter alia with Philby's views and ideas. But this work^s is common 
with biographies has not done full justice to the subject 
I have undertaken. 
The primary source materials which I have used 
are Philby's own writings: his travel accounts, serious 
books and a host of articles which he wrote on a variety 
of subjects. Second, I have benefited a lot from his bio-
graphy which has already been referred to. Infact this 
1-r Monroe, E. Philby of Arabia, op. cit. p.9. 
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work has been used to show the background, motive or reasons 
for the opinion which philby formed or the stand he took 
on one or another matter. Third, necessary assistance has 
been taken from a number of authentic books related with the 
various subjects Philby has dealt with. However, books by 
other writers have been consulted only when they were unavoi-
dably needed to illuminate a particular point. 
This dissertation, as is evident from its title 
(Philby's perception of Islam and the Arabs) aims to make 
a critical analysis of Philby's views and ideas about Islam 
and the Arabs. The first chapter - Arab Independence versus 
British Imperialism - deals with Philby's intellectual as 
well as practical contribution to the cause of Arab indepen-
dence. The second chapter- The Palestine problem - is mainly 
concerned with his views on the complex problem of Palestine. 
It also shows his differences with Ibn Saud and the letter's 
stand on the matter. The third chapter - Philby's Perception 
of Islam - takes into account his pre and post conversion 
view of Islam, specially the Wahhabee creed. The chapter 
is also concerned with Philby's conversion to Islam and 
the subsequent reaction of Christendom and his family members 
The fourth and the final chapter - Faith under the Weight of 
Wealth - discusses the discovery of oil and the subsequent 
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flood of wealth in Arabia, Most importantly it brings 
into focus the bad effect of oil riches on the Saudi society. 
The financial mismanagement caused by the sudden onset of 
fabulous wealth has also been critically examined. 
One may agree or may not agree with Philby's views 
on various Arab problems. It is, however, beyond doubt 
that his contribution to the field of Arab studies, specially 
his understanding of the Wahhabee creed as practised by 
the Nejdees during the period between the two Great Wars 
and his discourse on the bad effect of oil bonanza on Saudi 
moraJs and manners is unique, immensely valuable and merits 
a thorough and comprehensive study. 
***• 
CHAPTF.R 
ARAB INDEPENDENCE___VERSUS__BRITISH_IMPERIALISM 
Independence is in itself an inestimable 
asset both in nations and in individuals.And 
Arabia has become steadily more and more 
interesting as, awaking from its long sleep, 
it has braced itself to face the conditions 
of the modern world. At its poles it has had 
valuable experience, sometimes rather violent, 
of the imperial aims and methods of France 
and Italy. Everywhere else its political contacts 
have been and are with Great Britain alone. 
Now, Arabia is essentially a Muslim Country, 
For that reason in particular, and for many 
others, a love of independence -
particularly independence of infidel 
Control and domination - is ingrained 
in the Arabs..,, Having the same passion 
as the Englishman for personal liberty 
and independence, he has not learned the 
necessity of subordinating them to the common 
weal in face of a common danger. The danger 
does not arise from France or Italy,... The 
danger comes from Great Britain herself. 
Philby wrote the above possage in 1938 in his preface 
to Sheba's Daughters, a travelogue that deals with his 
experiences and exploration in Shabwa, Hadhramaut and Aden 
1) Philby, H. St. J.B,, Sheba's Daughters (Preface), 
London, 1939, P. XI, 
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Protectorates. In sum it reflects his views on European 
imperialism and Arab independence. However, the most 
salient feature of the passage is the remark that 
Britain was the greatest enemy of Arab independence, 
more so because it comes from an Englishman. 
Philby began his career as a civil servant of the 
British Government in India, It implies that he himself 
was, for some time,eigreat pillar of the British Empire, 
xserving its interest in full earnest. Infact it was only 
after his experiences in Arabia and his meeting with Ibn 
Saud that his outlook changed. As a result he began to 
regard imperialism, whether of Britain, France or Italy 
as a malady for international community and a perenial 
source of tension, war and bloodshed between the nations. 
He developed a firm conviction that independence was 
the birth-right of every individual and nation, and should 
be respected as such and preserved at all cost, 
Philby's efforts for Arab independence are both 
practical and intellectual. As a civil servant in Iraq 
and Transjordan he tried to achieve his aim in his official 
capacity. But when he saw that his endeavours were being 
frustrated by some influential people in the British 
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Government he resigned from his service in 1924 and 
decided to serve the Arab cause through his writings 
and speeches. :He became hypo-critical of Britain's 
imperial policies in the mandated territories of Pales-
tine and TransJordan which in his view aimed at denying 
the Arabs the right to self-determination. This brought 
him into a life long conflict with the British Government. 
Before we proceed to discuss in detail Philby's 
views of and struggle for Arab independence it seems 
necessary to state a few words about the nature and 
character of this extraordinary Englishman. Whether in 
his small family house or in the company of persons 
of his standing or even more prominent than him he always 
liked, even tried to dominate the scene. He wanted 
things going the way he liked. Anything against his will 
or challenging his dominant position would irritate 
him inviting his indignatiotn, Infact he was easy to 
please and even more easily could be incited to grouse 
and growl. This habit that he acquired in his school 
days seems to have become his second nature. In the pages 
to follow it will be witnessed time and again that he 
was too fond of forming an opinion on every matter and 
trying to play a role accordingly. 
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Independent- thinking is an admirable quality. But 
the moement it makes one feel as an expert par excellance 
whose opinion must be put above all, it becomes alarmingly 
dangerous. For his bloated ego makes him treat others 
as inferior. Moreover, such a man always tries to prove 
him right and others wrong. He finds a psychological 
and emotional satisfaction in doing so.When we study 
Philby's narrative of his own and that of other s'views 
about Arab independence, we are often compelled to feel 
that he is busy in such an act of self agrandizement. 
But Philby had some other characteristics which 
were bound to bring him close and closer to the Arabs, 
In the first place he was fiercely individualist and 
it was perhaps because of this reason that he became so, 
deeply associated with the Arab race that itself'is 
an individualist in the highest degree, and in his 
lands the trinity of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity 
is worshiped more frequently than even it was in France. ,1 
Similarly, as Freya Stark has put it, Philby was 
'gregarious and pugnacious, open in his enmities and 
2 
warm in his friendship.' One can see that how much this 
1. Philby, A Pilorim in Arabia. London, 1946, P. 11, 
2. As quoted in Monroe, E, Philby of Arabia, op. cit, 
P. 296. 
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remark is in consonance with the famous Arab saying 
that infact reflects an Arab characteristic; the enemy 
of my friend is my enemy and the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend. 
Another quality of Philby, as will be seen later on, 
specially when we will deal with his activities in Iraq 
and Transjordan was that he used to see everything in 
black and white and to call a spade a ". spade. It is an 
admirable quality in Arab society, specially among the 
Beduins. But in his native Britain it was a flaw and 
shortcoming. To a great extent it was this 'weak' aspect 
of his personality that prevented him from achieving 
success in British politics and civil services.Elizabeth 
Monroe, Philby's biographer, has also pointed out this 
flaw in his personality by comparing his career with that 
of his contemporary, T.Ee Lawrence ; 
'Philby is often bracketed with Lawrence 
because they both worked in the Arab 
World, but they were opposites in their 
handling of its arbiters. Where Lawrence 
rightly judged the tempo that suited 
the men in power, and was able 
to cajole them into doing as he advised, 
Philby, hectoring, intemperate and 
opinionated, 'provoked their wrath and 
lost his case. All through his life, he 
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saw himself as acting from the highest 
motives, and with a right, in a free 
country, to think what he liked and 
say what he thought about broken 
British promises, or his conscientious 
objection to war. The flaw in him 
was not the creeds he preached but 
his immoderation in expounding them. 
Monroe has further suggested that Philby, after 
having failed in his native country, 'sought abroad the 
name he reckoned he deserved'. It is true to a consider-
able extent. But one should also keep in mind that he 
had qualities similar to those of Arabs and thus it was 
natural that he would seek their companionship. Birds 
of the same feather flock together, 
GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF PHILBY'S ANTI-IMPERIALISM 
Philby's whole hearted support to the cause of Arab 
independence and his opposition to European, specially 
British imperialism developed in phases. In the beginning 
he was a conservative and a supporter of the British 
Empire, But gradually he moved away from it and came near 
to the Arabs, Infact his encounter with the people of 
1. Monroe, E. Philbv of Arabia, op. cit. Po 296, 
2. Ibid. 
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Arab origin dates back to his days at Cambridge. At 
Trinity college he had an Arab friend, Tawfiq al Arab 
with whomi he used tohave vigorous arguments on matters 
like imperialism and Britain's general attitude towards 
the Egyptians. In such conversations he usually used 
to stand by Britain's imperial policies in its colonies 
around the world. In his autobiagraphy, the Arabian Days 
he records an incident which sufficiently shows his love 
and support for British imperialism : 
'I never took much part in the activities of the 
Union and the only occasion I intervened in its 
weekly debates was to defend the British Gov-
ernment of the day against liberal criticism 
of its attitude towards the then famous but now 
forgotten pigeon-shooting incident at Denshawai 
in Upper Egypt'. 
But he could not remain an ultra conservative for 
long. The free atmosphere of Cambridge taught him 'to 
think, to think fearlessly and without inhibition by 
accepted standards, however far such thinking might carry 
us into the deeps and shoals of uncharted oceans.Criticism 
and controversy were the salt and savour of Cambridge 
life in those days, when the long established laws of 
1. Philby, Arabian Days. London, 1948, P. 34. 
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philosophy, politics, economics and everything else were 
beginning to be challenged or brought under reviewl 
In such an atmosphere.Philby, the champion of orthodoxy 
as he was known among his friends, was bound to change, 
In the final days of his Cambridge years he came to realize 
that the old fashioned structure of the British society 
was crumbling beyond repair, giving the place for a new 
liberal social order. He began to doubt the credebility 
of the old order and no longer believed in the r acial 
supremacy of whitemen. It was due to this change in his 
attitude that he 'refused to be influenced by a vigorous 
canvass in favour of a candidate who had been put up for 
the presidency of the Union against an Indian Vice-presi-
dent who in the normal course of things would have succeeded 
I 2 tothe chair without contest. 
But it does not mean that he had changed thoroughly. 
He allowed himself to be influenced by Fabian socialism, 
liberalism, free thought, even agnosticism but refused 
togo to the extent of embarking upon a prophetic dispensation 
to put an end to the conservative order of the Victorian 
era. Comparatively young men are open to new ideas and 
show a great deal of enthusiasm and dedication, especially 
in the sphere of intellectual discourse. But when they 
1. Ibid. P. 29 
2. Ibid. P, 34. 
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are asked to enter the practical field in order to realize 
their lofty ideals very few of them find courage to accept 
the call. On the contrary they turn out to be sheer 
careerist and futurists, Infact in his youth philby was 
a prototype of such youngmen. In his final days at Camb-
ridge he had begun to like to be associated with new 
idealogical and social movements but kept himself away 
from their practical requirements. He remained uncommitted 
to any particular dispensation, passed the examination 
of Indian Civil Service in 1907 and after necessary 
training on 6th November 1908 sailed to India to become 
a potential pillar of the British Empire and imperialism. 
But all had not gone in vain. The liberal atmosphere 
of Cambridge had made an impact on Philby, That is the 
reason that unlike other tiritish officials he used to 
mix with Indians, to behave them gently and to understand 
their nature and problem in order to provide them an 
effective administration which will be serving them in 
the real sense. But what he saw in India was appalling. 
Corruption was rampant among the subordinate administrative 
staff such as policemen, bailiffs, revenue surveyors, 
orderlies etcetera who were mostly of Indian origin, 
Philby diagnosed that these men were so poorly paid that 
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they can hardly afford to feed their families, hence 
corruption and dishonesty were inevitable. In his opinion 
Indians were not corrupt by nature. They can be as 
honest and efficient administrator as a British 
could be if only they were handsomely or reasonably 
paid. In his youthful enthusiasm one day he aired his 
views in the presence of a senior British officer, namely, 
Wakefield, who was a member of Anglo-Indian community, 
born and brought up in India, The answer philby received 
from the said gentleman suprised and appalled him ; 
'Don't make the mistake of thinking that 
you were born to reform the government of India , 
Philby never forgot those 'words of wisdom'nor 
condoned the system, but always hoped that all will change 
for good when India wins freedom and the right to rule 
herself, 
7 
Philby, nodoubt, wished independence for the people 
of British colonies. But he was against the employment 
of violent or revolutionary methods in order to achieve 
such a goal. His idea was tnat Britain as a civilized 
1. Ibid. P. 52. 
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and advanced nation should prepare her imperial subjects 
for self rule. He took these ideas to Mesopotamia where 
he was shifted from India during the First World War, 
But it seems that for the time being he thrust aside 
all his ideas about the independence of Arabs and other 
subjects of the British Empire. The Great War made him 
so great a patriot that once again he began to think like 
an ultra conservative keeping aside the liberal ideas that 
he had imbibed at Cambridge. He became extremely influenced 
by Sir Percy Cox, an imperialist par excellence who was 
opposed to the idea of Arab independenceo One day in 
October 1916 he (Cox) criticised the Arab Bureau of 
Cairo which was craving independence for the Arabs : 
'Cairo has practically forced us in to 
agreeing not to annex these parts, (of 
/Mesopotamia that by the time were occupied 
by the British after defeating the Turks) but 
merely to administer them for the Arab nation. 
Philby was young and impressionable© Under the 
influence of Cox and the magical spell of ultra patriotism 
that the Great War had created in him, he confided to 
his diary : 
1. Monroe, Elizabeth, Philby of Arabia, op cit. p.52. 
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'It is rather a blo\w, but one hopes that nothing 
will come of such an egregious mistake, made 
without consulting and against the view of 
Sir Percy'.-'• 
It was either a kind of mental aberration or a 
momentry phase in Philby's overall thinking. For just 
after a year he began to crave for Arab independence, 
-specially after his meeting with Ibn Saud in t- '• Najd 
to whose Court he was sent with a special mission in 
November 1917, 
PHILBY IN ARABIA 
Cox had set three main tasks for the 'Philby mission'. 
First he had to persuade Ibn Saud to attack his hereditary 
enemy Ibn Flashid of Hail who was in open alliance with 
the Turks, hence Britain's declared enemy. Such a campaign 
from the view-point of Britain's war stretegy was' of 
vital importance for it was bound to further 'Lawrence's 
campaign against the Turks on the flank of General 
Allenby's army, now within the striking distance of 
Jerusalem'. Second, he had to try to patch up Ibn Saud's 
differences with his two eastern neighbours, Kuwait and 
1. Ibid. 
2. Philby, Arabian Davs. Op, cit, P, 158 
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the Ajman tribe. It, too, had military significance. 
The Turks and their allies were getting all necessary 
goods, though at immense price,through their agents and 
smugglers whose routes of supply were made safe and 
secure because of the loose blockade mainly owing to the 
differences between Ibn Saud, the Shaikh of Kuwait and 
the Ajman tribe. The British hoped that a patchup between 
the three rivals would enable them to enhance their 
chances of blockading the Turks and their allies in central 
Arabia in a more effective manner. Philby's third task, 
which was the most important for Britain's stretegic 
interest in order to eliminate all possible threats to 
Lawrence's campaign in the Hijaz, was to prevent any 
serious conflict between King Husayn and Ibn Saud by 
clearing the air between the two arch rivals of Arabia. 
Philby worked hard, almost for a year to achieve 
his target. But ultimately his mission collapsed. For 
in the light of new realities - conquest of all Palestine 
and Syria and the retreat of the Turks in northern Iraq 
which meant the virtual end of war against them - Ibn 
Saud was once again reduced to insignificance. Hence his 
cooperation was no more needed. 
But we are not concerned with the failure of Philby's 
mission to Ibn Saud. What concerns us here is that this 
- 1 4 -
first of Philby's many journeys into Arabia changed his 
outlook for the rest of his life. 
While in Iraq he had never met an Arab authoritative 
and ambitious enough to impress upon his mind that the 
Arabs v\)ere competent and prepared to rule themselves 
without foreign interference. But his desert adventure 
in to Arabia brought him into contact with the Arabs who 
were born and brought up in an atmosphere of freedom and 
were able to manage their affairs independently and with 
admirable competence. He was specially influenced by the 
charming and powerful personality of Ibn Saud whom he 
later described as 'beyond all price.' In Ibn Saud he 
found the man who, in his earnest opinion, had all qualities 
and abilities to unite the Arabs under his dynamic and 
able leadership-. His strong support for -'•bn Saud brought 
h1rn in to open conflict with the Britain's Foreign Office, 
whose declared policy was to favour King Husayn's claims 
in Arabia. 
ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION 
A month after the disappointing end of his (Philby) 
mission to Ibn Saud, on 8th November 1918, France and 
Britain issued a statement about their future policy in 
1. Monroe, E. Philbv of Arabia, opo cit, P. 93. 
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respect of the territories liberated from the Ottaman 
rule. This statement which later came to be known as 
Anglo-French Declaration was issued just four days 
before the Armistice with Germanyo Philby was particularly 
happy to hear it and became extremely sanguine about its ' 
consequence for it tallied with and stimulated his new 
ideas that he had recently acquired during the course of 
his mission to ibn Saud about Arab independenceo This 
very Declaration later became the bedrock on which he 
founded all his criticism of Anglo-French imperial designs 
and practices directed to suppress the Arab desire for 
freedom. Since the Declaration is vitally important for 
a proper understanding of Philby's criticism of Anglo-
French imperialism and his stand on Arab independence, 
it is quoted here at length : 
The object aimed at by France and Great Britain 
in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by 
the ambition of Germany is the complete and defi-
nite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed 
by the Turks and the establishment of national 
governments and ddministrations deriving their 
authority from the initiative and free choice of 
the indigenous populations. 
In order to carryout these intentions France 
and Great Britain are at one in encouraging 
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and assisting the establishment of indigenous 
governments and administrations in Syria 
and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, 
and in the territories the liberation of which 
they are engaged in securing and recognizing 
these as they are actually established. 
Far from wishing to impose on the 
populations of these regions any particular 
institutions they are only concerned to ensure 
by their support and by adequate assistance 
the regular working of Governments and admini«,-rat-
ions freely chosen by the populations themselves'. 
As mentiond above Philby had welcomed the Declara-
tion as an admirable statement of liberal policy. He 
advised Arnold Wilson who had replaced Persy Cox to 
implement the declaration in spirit and letter. But 
Wilson was an out and out imperialist. He regarded the 
Declaration as a Veritable bombshell, shattering in 
advance the gigantic imperial structure, of which he 
had long dreamed as covering the whole area of the 
Middle East. To disabuse the high hopes of independence 
now rising in Arab breasts as the result of this declara-
tion, he issued his own statement of policy in which. 
1. Ibid. P. 95 
Also see Europe Pub. The Middle East and North Africa 
1988 London, 1987.P. 64. 
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while paying the necessary lip-service to the document 
of 8th November, he made it clear that, as the people 
of Mesopotamia were obviously incapable of governing 
themselves, he proposed to educate them in that art on 
the municipal level. Elections were shortly to be held 
for the proposed municipal committees in the big towns, 
each of which wos to have a British president, vice-president 
and secretary, while the elected members would have full 
rights of discussion but no vote. 
But it were Wilson's ideas,and not philby's, which 
reflected the policy of the British Government, In fact 
the two countries, Britain and France were not sincere 
in their pledge to the Arabs, The main purpose of the 
Declaration was just to show the world that they were 
not far behind the doctrine of self-determination as 
proclaimed in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, But in 
reality they were fully determined to continue with 
their old fashioned imperialism as the subsequent events 
proved it beyond doubt, 
SECRET PACTS. PROMISES AND THE MANDATES 
Infact during the First Wolrd War the Triple Extent 
(Britain, France and Russia) had entered into secret 
1. Philby, Arabian Davs. op, cit, P, 173, 
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agreements regarding the Ottoman Empire, The first 
agreement was signed on March 18, 1915 in Constantinople 
according to which the territories of northern Syria, 
Asia Minor and Iren (which was not a part of the Ottoman 
Empire) were divided among the member countries. Over a 
month later on April 26, 1915 another agreement was signed 
in London mainly to satisfy Italy which by that time had 
joined the war and demanded its share of the spoils. 
Meanwhile Sir Henry McMahon had given a word to 
Shetif Husayn of Mecca about an independent Arab state 
that was to be established in the Arab territories 
liberated from the Turks. The French did not know about 
it. On October 21, 1915 the British informed them and 
suggested that the problem should be solved amiably in 
a bilateral conference. As a result Sir Mark Sykes of 
Britain and Charles Georges - Picot of France met together 
and singed an agreement in February 1916 which was later 
ratified by Italy and Russia and came to be known as 
Sykes-Picot Agreement. In plain words this agreement 
nullified the pledge of the independent Arab state made 
to the Arabs through the Husayn^ McMahon correspondence. 
Not only Sykes-Picot Agreement but equally disturbing 
was the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which viewed'with 
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favour the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people , Thus between 1915 and 1917 
the imperialist powers made atleast two promises, one 
to the Arabs and the other to the Jews and signed the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement which all were contradictory to 
each other. 
Meanwhile the American President Woodrow Wilson 
had announced his famous Fourteen Points Programme. Like 
millions of people around the globe he was of the opinion 
that the Great War was fought and won by the Allied Forces 
to make the world safe far democracy. He also considered 
and consisted that all the secret agreements signed 
during the war should now stand invalid, specially after 
his Fourteen points. But the British and the French had 
other notions. Tljey wanted to impose their imperial 
designs on the Arabs, 
The post war period raised a number of serious 
problems which needed immediate attention of the victorius 
powers. As a result they held a peace conference in 
Paris soon after the end of the war. In the Paris Peace 
Conference and later in the league of Nations the contest 
1. Europe Pub., The Middle East and North Africa,1988. 
op. cit, P.63. 
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was between the Anglo-French imperialism and the prin-
ciple of self-determination as proclaimed in Woodrow 
Wilson's Fourteen Points. 
The Paris Conference failed to reach at any under-
standing about the Arab Fertile Crescent. However, France 
and Britain disregarding the other parties involved, signed 
an agreement in September 1919 which practically amounted 
to the ratification of the Sykes-Picot Agreement on the 
one hand - • and the nullification of the Anglo-French 
Declaration on the other. In accordance with the agreement 
the French troops soon replaced the British army in Syria* 
Faisal protested but to no avail. The Syrian nationalists, 
however, devised plans to counteract the imperial designs 
of France and Britain. The Syrian Congress led fcy the 
Fatat Society held a meeting in Damascus on March 20, 
1920, declared the independence of Syria (which included 
^banon and Palestine) and appointed Faisal as their 
king. 
France and Britain rejected the decision of the 
Congress, and went on preparing to participate in the 
San Remo Conference which was held over a month later 
on April 24, 1920 to decide the fate of the Fertile 
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Crescent. The conference invented the idea of mandatory 
government on the pretext that Arabs were not capable 
of running an independent state. Hence they should be 
educated in this art by the so-called advanced nations, 
Britain was recognised as mandatory power over Palestine 
and Iraq and France over Syria. The mandates were approved 
by the League of Nations in July 1922 and recognized by 
the United States in 1924.-^  
We have noted above that France had rejected the 
decision of the Syrian Congress about the independence 
of Syria,Three months after the San Remo Conference, on 
July 24,1920*, they occupied that country and ousted 
Faisal at gun point. Interestingly by the same time Iraqis 
had risen in rebellion against the British rule. It 
shows that the people of the two countries had rejected 
the so-called mandates out right and wanted to run their 
affairs without any outside interference,But neither 
the French nor the British were prepared to give up their 
imperial ambitions. 
See for details about Sykes-Picot Agreement.',Paris 
Peace Conference and mandates etcetera in Armajani, 
Yahya Middle East. Past and Present (Second Edition), 
New Jersey, 1986. PP.223-238 and PP.269-281. 
Also see Philbv.Arabia. London 1930 PP. 230-293. 
Also see Fisher Sydney Nettleton, The Middle East? A 
History, (second edition), London, 1971,PP.361-r388 and 407-445, 
Also see, John,Robert and Sami Hadawi.The Palestine 
Diary (Vol.1) Beirut, 1970.PP.75-160 
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The British were able to quell the rebellion 
after landing some 65000 troops and spending about 
i. 1,000,000. Besides, the casualities on both sides 
including the loss of some high ranking British officers 
were too high to be ignored. The policy makers in White-
hall were shaken. They reinstated Cox as High Commissioner, 
reviewed the imperial policies pursued by Wilson and 
decided to be liberal towards the Iraqis, 
Cox needed his own men to bring things in order 
in Iraq. He had always admired Philby's abilities, both 
mental and physical, Philby was a glutton for work, 
working all day long and far in to night. Naturally Cox 
asked him to help him in his new role. 
PHTfRV TM MFSnPOTAMTA 
Philby had always criticised Arnold Wilson for his 
high-handed approach, narrow vision and his determination 
to suppress the Arab desire and struggle for freedom. 
In his view a republic was the only panacea for all the 
ills of Mesopotamia, This is the reason when Faisal's 
English friends suggested to Cox to install him King of 
Iraq whom the French had ousted from Syria in July 1920, 
1. See Armajani, Yahya, Middle EastiPast and Present. 
op. cit. P. 276. ~ ~ ~ 
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Philby discouraged the idea. Instead he advised Cox 
not to do anything without consulting the people of 
Iraq, Moreover he 'prepared a memorandum for him(Cox) 
on this subject, and also on the general lines on which, 
starting with a representative provisional government, 
we might proceed with free elections to a constituent 
assembly, which would determine the future constitution 
of the country and if so desired, choose the future head 
of State'.•'• 
It is clear that Philby's thinking was in line with 
the principle of self-determination. Cox seems to have 
accepted his suggestion, for soon he decided and worked 
in^perfect union and harmony', with Philby and Miss Bell 
to'set up in Baghdad a provisional Government that would 
meet with universal approval and acceptance'. 
The Provisional Government was to have had a council 
of Ministers consisting purely of Iraqis and each minister 
was to be assisted by a British adviser. The advisers were 
simply to help, not to rule or run the country. It seems 
that Philby, along with Cox and Miss Bell, was determined 
1. Philby, Arabian Days, op. cit. P. 186. 
2. Ibid, P, 191. 
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to prove Wilson wrong on all fronts who, after learning the 
Anglo-French Declaration had contemplated to set up city 
councils in which the elected native members would enjoy 
the right to discuss but not to vote or take any decision. 
In Wilson's opinion the -l^ raqis were incompetent and 
unprepared to manage their affairs, hence the British 
paternalism. But for philby gone were the days of pater-
nalism and imperialism; it was the time to stand for 
and abide by liberal ideas. For him Wilson's ideas were 
obsolete and outmoded. In his view the only role left 
for the so-called, advanced nations was to help the natives, 
in Iraq or elsewhere, to form indpendent governments 
and administrations. 
Cox seemed to share some of Philby's liberalism, 
atleast for the time being. But the main problem before 
him was to pickup suitable men for various ministeries 
and to select wise advisers for the ministers. An equally 
important task was to prepare a set of guidelines in 
order to maintain a balanced relationship between the 
ministers and their British advisers. Cox took upon 
himself to interview the prospective candidates for 
various ministeries and asked Philby to do the other works. 
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For Philby it was a golden chance to make his 
contribution to the cause of Arab independence. He happily 
accepted the new role and in close contact with Cox 
'drafted a scheme for the contemplated British advisory 
staff covering the whole administration from the minis-
teries down to the districts and subdistricts. Apart 
from high officials at headquarters, Wilson had recruited 
and posted to the districts no fewer than 130 British 
administrative officers, who would now have to be replaced 
by Arab Mutasarrifs, Qaim-maqams and Mudirs, Only a 
small part of this British personnel would be needed to 
remain as Advisers and assistant advisers*. 
Cox, more or less, accepted the scheme and at 
last the Council of Ministers was set up with Saiyid 
Abd al Rehman, the Naqib of Baghdad at the head, Saiyid 
Talib, an ambitious and shrewd politician who was disliked 
by both Cox and Gertrude Bell, was given the important 
portfolio of interior with Philby as his adviser. Philby 
immediately began to couch him in right ideas. 
Thus the provisional Government settled ". down 
to its work. Its main task, for which it had been established, 
was to draft an electoral law. After much discussion, 
1. Ibid. P, 193, 
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arguments and controversies the Naqib's Government 
was able to draft and pass such a law and sent to the 
High Commissioner for promulgation, Philby was happy 
that his dreams were coming true. But his joy was short-
lived. 
While Cox and his men were striving with might 
and main to educate the Iraqis in the art of self~rule, 
others, some of them occupying Key positions in the 
British Government began to think on quite a different 
line, Winston Churchil, an imperialist par excellence, 
had become new Colonial Secretary, He invited Lawrence 
to serve him who readily accepted the offer, thinking 
that the Fate had given him another chance to ^ strike a 
last doughty blow for his friend, Faisal, then languishing 
in Italyl^ 
Churchil had inherited many problems from his 
predecessor. He decided to hold a conference in Cairo 
to settle all Middle Eastern problems. In a matter of days 
he was able to carveout two kingdoms, one in Iraq and 
the other in TransJordan, Faisal being more amenable was 
1. Ibid. P. 196. 
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rewarded with the'Kingdom of Iraq' and his brother 
Abdullah whose services to the British Crown were not 
too little was installed the 'Amir on probation' of the 
less co\reted Transjordan. An.V . 'Amir on probation' 
was'a'novel idea and only an imperialist like Churchil 
could have conceived it. 
But most Iraqis, according to Philby, wanted a 
republic, not a puppet Hashimite Kingdom under Faisal, 
The Provisional Government under the Naqib had worked 
well proving Philby's belief that the Iraqis, if properly 
couched in right ideas, had ability to run an independent 
government. Philby, more than any other British adviser 
had assured both the Naqib, head of the Council of 
Ministers and Saiyid Talib, the Interior Minister that 
Britain was sincere in its promise to the people of 
Iraq that they will be given full freedom to choose 
their own destiny. Naturally he was extremely disturbed, 
more than anyone else, when he learned the news that 
the Cairo conference had appointed Faisal as King of 
Iraq, 
The news was sad enough to cause personal frust-
trations as well. Since his first private meeting with 
Ibn Saud he had been dreaming for an independent Arab 
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state. In Iraq the Fate had offered him a chance and 
he did every thing that was in his possession to realize 
his dream. But, alas, his dream palace collapsed in 
Cairo Conference which, disregarding the Anglo-French 
Declaration and the British pledge to the Iraqis, had 
denied them the right to self-determination, Philby 
upbraided the British Government for betraying a 'sacred 
trust for civilization,' 
Not only Philby but notable Iraqis too were 
against the installation of a Hashimite puppet in 
their country. Saiyid Talib, more than anyone else, was 
opposed to any such move. He was shrewd, Knew about the 
segments of the population opposed to Faisal and was in 
a position to rouse them in rebellion. In order to prevent 
any such eventuality Cox got him arrested in an unchivalrous 
manner and exiled him to Celon. 
There is much controversy regarding the arrest of 
Saiy^ id Talib. According to one version he was arrested 
in the house of Sir Percy Cox where Lady Cox had invited 
him on a cup of tea. But this is wrong. It is true 
that Lady Cox had invited Talib to attend a tea party 
but she did it in all innocence without knowing the 
plot for the arrest of her guest. Infact this oppor-
tunity was seized upon by the conspiring British 
officers who were ordered by no one but Cox him self 
to carryout their nefarious plot. As a result Saiyid 
Talib was arrested when he was on his way home, just 
outside the Residency, after attending the tea party. 
Philby always regarded his arrest as a sheer injustice 
and in 1924 pleaded with J.H.Thomas, the Labour Colonial 
Secretary to undo the wrong by allowing Talib to 
return back to Iraq. 
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Philby was not officially informed about the 
arrest and subsequent banishment of his minister. He 
learned the news in a dance party and was naturally very 
furious. Next morning he went to see Cox, intending to 
resign. But Cox won over him and as a result he was 
appointed acting Interior Minister, He was also assured 
that Faisal will not be imposed but will contest for 
the crown of Iraq in a free and fair election. 
Cox was aware of Philby's abilities and thought 
that he will be immensely useful in smoothing Faisal's 
way to the throne of Iraq if only he could be reconciled 
with the Hashimite protagonist. With this view in mind 
he sent Philby to welcome Faisal in Basra hoping that 
the later's charm and poise will win the former^ allegiance 
to him. Miss Bell dubbed Cox's step as a'master stroke 
of policy'. But she was wrong. For it turned out to be 
a fiasco. Neither she nor Cox could judge the depth of. 
his ^ conviction that a republic was the right regime 
for Iraq, and that every man had a right to choose its 
ruler for itselfl 
On his way to Basra he was asked by the British 
and native officers that what kind of arrnagement they 
1. Monroe, E., Philby of Arabia, op. cit, Po 109 
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nad to make in order to welcome Faisal. His answer 
was simple and plain that the coming guest was only a 
candidate in an election, hence no special programmes 
or functions should be organized by the Government officers 
in his honour. 
At Basra he greeted Faisal with coolness. Faisal 
was nonplussed at his unceremonious welcome. However, 
he controlled his sentiments, behaved well and talked 
with Philby on a variety of topics. Philby was his usual 
frankself when Faisal asked about the chances of his 
success J 
'It rather depends on your own attitude• 
So far as the poepl in general have any 
policy, it sums up in the one word 
independence. The rebellion was led and 
fought on that single issue. It was disc-
ontinued in response to the British gover-
nment's acceptance of the change of a policy 
on the basis of independence. Now, if 
you intend to base your campaign on 
the fact that you are the accepted nominee 
of the British government, I think 
your chances are extremely slender. 
If on the other hand you declare that 
you seek the suffrage of the people as a 
champion of their complete independence, 
then I think that you have a better chance 
than anybody. 
1. As Quoted in Monroe, E, Philbv of Arabia, opocit. 
P. 110. 
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Faisal was intelligent enough to read the under-
current of Philby's sermen. That Philby was in favour 
of a republic and that there was considerable appoiition 
to his candidature. But Cox removed his anxiety when 
he, disregarding the commitment he had -specially given 
to Philby for a free and fair election^advised the 
Provisional Government to hold a farcical election to 
ensure Faisal's success, A ludicrous referendum was then 
held and Faisal was proclaimed King of Iraq on July 11, 
1921. 
Thus once again Philby was betrayed. And this 
time by his own hero. Cox. Moreover it was no one else 
but Cox himself who ordered him to quit' the Government-
'Philby, bristling with righteous indignation, answered 
back. He was quite ready to handover, he would have 
wanted to stay only if free elections were to be held, 
as had been promised, a rigged choice of Britain's 
candidate '/as against his principles,' He was glad to 
2 
leave and to be out of all this unpleasant intrigue. 
1) I b i d . P . 1 1 1 . 
2) Ph i lby , Arabian Days, opo c i t . P . 205 . 
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IN TRANSJORDAN 
But he was out only to get engaged in Trans-
jordan, once more to work for Arab independence, Trans-
jordan /^ as a half-desert and half-cultivated land lying 
on the east bank of Jordan River, Till July 1920 it was 
ruled by Faisal from Damascus, But when the French 
dismantled him it became a land without a ruler, Herbert 
Samuel, the then British High Commissioner for Palestine 
suggested to occupy it militarily. But the War Office 
rejected the idea outright. The High Commissioner, then 
appointed six young British officers to run its few 
settled towns. They were instructed to encourage local 
self-government and to extend their advice only when 
asked for it. 
But the situation changed dramatically when in 
November 1920 Amir Abdullah bent on harrying the French 
for wronging his brother Faisal attacked the area and 
quickly occupied some of its important towns. By March 
1921 he had taken the vital town of Amman, He was well 
supported by Syrian dissidents and Arab nationalists 
and was in a position to threaten Syrian borders. The 
British were alarmed. For a confrontation with the French, 
their Ally in Syria, was not in their interest. 
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Abdullah's capture of Amman coincided with the 
Cairo Conference where Churchil took the decision to 
install Faisal in Iraq. He was still in Cairo when he 
learned about Abdullah's adventures and his intention 
for further advances in the direction of Syria. He immedi-
ately left for Jerusalem and invited Abdullah to see 
him there. Finding him amenable and civilized Churchil 
made him the *Amir on probation* of Transjordan at a salary 
of -J5,000 per month. Abdullah was on a six month trial 
and his Kingdom' a part of the mandated territory of 
Palestine. 
It will be erroneous to think that churchil's 
gesture was without reason or merely to appease the 
adventurist Abdullah. In fact he had taken the step to 
serve some vital British interests. First Jordan was 
important for Britain in order to defend the Suez Canal 
and the Red Sea zone. Second, since the discovery of oil 
in Iraq it had become stretegically important for the 
export of oil. Finally it was argued that Abdullah, 
being heavily dependent on Britain, can be easily mani-
pulated, whenever, needed, to serve the British interests. 
This is evident from the f act that when king Husayn 
refused to recognize the British mandate it was Abdullah 
who was easily persuaded hy Lawrence to sign a document 
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recognizing the British mandate over Palestine. 
Abdullah, after having been appointed Amir was 
facing many problems '.specially in the handling of tribe-
smen. There were disturbances all over the country. By 
September 1921 the law and order situation became so 
worst that Churchil dispatched Lawrence to Transjordan 
to set things right according to his own wisdom. Within 
two months he was able to bring normalcy in the country. 
But having done so he tendered his resignation for reasons 
unknown, Philby, was, then, appointed by Churchil as 
Chief British Representative in Transjordan, 
Philby arrived in Amman in November 1921 with 
all the assurances he needed from the Colonial Office 
in order to discharge his dueties. Those assurances in 
Philby's own words were as follows : 
'The mandates for Palestine, both under the 
Supreme control of a single High Comm-
issioner, would be administered quite separa-
tely. The Zionist clause of the mandate would 
on no account apply to Trans-Jordan, And, 
so long as that country refrained from being 
a nuisance to all its neighbours as it certainly 
had been of late, the British Government was 
prepared to let it develop as a self-governing 
entity. Under the general control of Sir Herbert 
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Samuel, but entirely independent of the 
Palestine administratior, I would be the 
Chief British Representative, with a free 
hand to advise the Amir Abdullah and 
his government as I thought fit in the 
working out of their salvation. 
Philby at once settled to his work. He had two 
major problems to solve. First, to stop Abdullah's 
spending sprees and organize the collection of local 
taxes. Second, to steer the country towards independence 
by encouraging Abdullah to hold elections for a repre-
sentative assembly. Besides, he had to normalize Abdullah's 
relations with the French and determine his borders with 
the neighbouring countries. Since Abdullah was cooperative 
in the beginning Philby succeeded to bring the country 
back on the line. By the end of July 1922, the law and 
order situation had improved and the whole country, from 
north to south, was well in hand. To some extent tax 
collection, too, was regularized. In sum Philby's reports 
of over all progress were satisfactory and encouraging. 
As a result the colonial office invited Abdullah to London 
to discuss the terms for granting independence to his 
country. 
1. Ibid. pp. 208-209, 
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Abdullah went to London in October 1922 and 
was promised independence for the good work he had done 
in collaboration with Philby, But the documents of inde-
pendence could be handed over to him by Herbert Samuel 
in a function at Amman in May 1923. The main points of 
the document, as Philby summed them up were as follows 
'That His Majesty's Government, subject 
to the approval of the League of Nations, 
recognized the existence in Trans-Jordan 
of an independent administration under 
the Amir Abdullah, provided that 
such administration should be condu-
cted on democratic and constitutional 
lines, and should, by an agreement 
to be negotiated thereafter, place 
His Majesty's Government in a 
position to discharge its international 
obligations in respect of the terri-
tory in question, 
A hot gospeller of Philby's class for Arab 
independence was naturally happy over the prospects of 
independence for TransJordan. But ail his hopes were 
frustrated in a short span of time. Infact this very 
pleasant event marks the beginning of the failure of 
his mission to Abdullah's court. 
1. Piiilby,'TransJordan•, in Central Asiatic Society 
Journal Vol, XI, 1924,9,304. 
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Gradually Abdullah becan^ e autocratic and extra-
vagant. In keeping with the declaration of independence 
and also in the interest of Amir Abdullah himself Philby 
advised to convene a representative assembly as soon 
as possible. He tried to convince the Amir that a repre-
sentative government will benefit him within and outside" 
the country. For in Philby's opinion it was bound to he^p 
dispel the impression that he always collected on his 
rounds among the Beduin and the sedentary population alike 
that Abdullah was merely a figure head playing in the hand 
of Christian Britain and that the old Turkish administra-
tion was preferable because that was not subordinate to 
any infidel power. He further suggested that the introduction 
of democracy in the country will win the support of many 
It is strange that while Philby was encouraging 
Abdullah to win the British support for the independence 
of his country, he did also encourage the Amir to expel 
or supress the Syrian nationalists who had associated 
themselves with him (Abdullah) after the French occupied 
their country in July 1920, These nationalists favoured 
complete freedom in every Arab country, specially in 
Syria where from they had come. But Philby did not 
extend his support to them, nor he ever explained the 
reasons for doing so. However, there are two possibilities. 
First, perhaps Philby wos not in agreement with the 
nationalists whose main demand was complete freedom 
and not a limited one in alliance with Britain which 
he himself favoured. Second, he realized that they 
Syrian nationalists v/ere merely individuals and mainly 
interested in Syria's independence. Moreover, the'* had 
little infleunce with the people of Transjordan, Next 
they were an anathema to both, the higher British 
officialsin Polestine and the French in Syria. Philby 
perhaps thought that in the given circumstances his alliance 
with the nationalists would not serve his purpose of 
promoting Transjordanian independence, lnstm4 it «ay 
jeopardise it. For the presence of undesirable eifiMents 
in the country would certainly prevent the British fr<Mi 
aQD£OVina of ^nv olan for Abdullah's inrf»a*k«*ia9M«fc_ 
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more influential persons who were incharge of Britain's 
colonies around the globe. 
But Abdullah did not heed to his advice and went 
on enjoying his autocratic power, showing no desire to 
curtail it by introducing a democratic system. His 
ministers and officials were also encouraging him not to 
convene a representative assembly. For they feared that 
the elected members will remove them from their lucrative 
posts. What a government composed of such elements and 
headed by such a blind autocrat can do is any body's 
guess? In the words of Philby the treasury was^robbed 
right and left, essential Services were allowed to suffer 
by non-payment of the salaries of their personnel, Gover-
nment's lands were distributed among the Amir's favourite 
Shaikhs without any corresponding advantage to the public 
exchequer, even private owners were expropriated for the 
benefit of those who coveted their holdings.Badawin 
Shaikhs were allowed to remain, infact, immune from the 
payment of due taxes, while the poorer agricultural classes 
and some of them are very poor indeed - were forced to pay 
not only current taxation, but all uncollected arrears 
of taxation dating back to 1918'. 
1. Ibid. p. 305. 
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Philby was aware of the deteriorating economic 
and political condition but remained fully committed 
to the principle of non-interference. The reasons he gave 
in support of his stand clearly shows his commitment to 
and love for Arab independence : 
1 did not think that the people were 
entitled to independence if they were 
unable to achieve it by their own 
efforts and a little sacrifice 
of their personal comfort. 
Next, he feared that his interference might result 
in the collapse of Abdullah's regime inviting the reimp-
osition of Palestine administration under Samuel which he 
regarded as disasterous for the independence of Trans-
Jordan. 
But the situation was deteriorating day by day, 
inviting interference, Philby's patience was completely 
exhausted when he learned about the aestruction of a 
Byzantine basilica near Amman which had withstood the rava-
ges of time and human neglect for about fifteen hundred 
years. He told Abdullah that the destruction of such a 
monument by any criterion was not admirable. It can neither 
be sanctioried nor condoned. He also took this opportunity 
to warn him that his autocratic and tyranical rule was 
1. Ibid, P, 30b. 
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bound toxouse people in rebellion. As on many previous 
occasions he advised him to base his administration on 
the principles of justice and democracy and to convene 
a representative assembly. 
But instead of introducing long-needed reforms in 
his government and administration, holding elections for 
a representative assembly and putting an end to the 
oppression and terrorization of his poor subjects Abdullah 
deputed his secretary to Jerusalem to complain to Herbert 
Samuel of Philby's'outrageous' criticism of his adminis-
tration and government. Mean while Philby, too, had reported 
to the High Commissioner about the destruction of the 
basilica and upbraided Abdullah as : 
'Unfit for the exercise of the despotic 
power he enjoys under the present regime. 
It was necessary to remind him that 
a representative assembly was an 
essential condition of our recogni-
tion of independence under his rule. 
Samuel intervened, but to Philby's surprise and 
9 
annoyance in favour of Abdullah. From that moment Philby 
knew that he and Abdullah were destined to part company. 
He was disappointed for Abdullah had let him down by his 
1. As quoted in Monroe,E., Philby of Arabia, op.cit. P.130, 
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irresponsible actions. But he was more annoyed, and 
eventually became critical of Herbert Samuel who, in his 
view, was encouraging the Amir in his maladministration. 
After the basilica event Samuel began to deal directly 
with Abdullah ignoring Philby, the Chief British Represen-
tative. Philby protested but to no avail. He then took 
it not as an indictment of his performance but as an 
indication of Samuel's intention to take full control of 
Transjordan. For only tiiis way he could open the door of 
TransJordan for Jewish immigration. Finding him helpless 
in the face of unmanagable circumstances and realizing 
that he was not in a position to work any longer for 
Arab independence he handed inhis resignation in 1924, 
In a letter to his friend, Harold Dickson he gave two 
major reasons for his resignation; 
'I have resigned this jott for many, very 
many reasons, the chief of them is that I can 
no longer go on working withthe present 
High Commissioner who, being a Zionist Jew, 
can not hold the scales even between Zionist 
and Arab interests. Besides this, Abdullah has 
rather let me down by his personal extravagance, 
which is on such a scale that he is simply invit-
ing interference, and getting it in full measure 
from H.M.G., which means the Zionist element. 
So I am off. 
1. As quoted in Monroe E., Philby of Arabia op.cit. P. 132, 
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Annoyed and disappointed, he spoke of the sinking 
ship of an independent Transjordan at a farewell party 
hosted in his honour by the Royal Air Force. Later, 
when he went to see Abdullah to bid him farewell he became 
emotional and spoke out his heart; 
'I have done my best for you,.,, I have 
never since I came here had any desire 
but to establish your authority as inde-
pendent ruler of an independent State, 
We have had our disagreements naturally 
enough. But I have never been your friend 
or colleague. You will find my successor, 
however friendly, will be your master. 
I am sorry that my dream of an indepen-
dent Arab State in Trans-Jordan has not 
come true. 
Philby's prophesy was proved right by subsequent 
events. He was succeeded by Sir Henry Cox. He (Cox) 
soon realized that Abdullah was unmanagable and reported 
to the high officials in Palestine that he (Abdullah) 
was a*disease which was rapidly destroying the country. 
Peake, another British officer, had earlier prepared a 
report on the history of Abdullah's administration 
which was very damaging. He had stated unequivocally 
1, Philby, Arabian Days, op. cit, P, 236. 
2. Wilson, Mary. C. King Abdullah. Britain and the Making 
of Jordan. Cambridge, 1987 P. 83. 
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that Abdullah was a weak administrator and suggested 
to get rid of him on a suitable occasion. The British 
knew that the Amir was due to go to Mecca for the holy 
pilgrimage in June 1924 and decided to warn him when he 
would return from the holy land. They framed an ultimatum 
and delivered it to him on 14 August 1924. Cox had made 
it clear that the Amir would be allowed to return back 
to Transjordan only when he agreed with the ultimatum. 
Abdullah conceded and accepted all the British demands 
'concerning military inspection and control'/, the expulsion 
of undesirables (nationalist elements), the conclusion of 
an extradiction agreement with Syria and the abolition 
of the department of tribal administration! It is clear 
that Cox was the real master and not the so-called 
independent' Abdullah. Philby's prophesy*my successor... 
will be your master' had come true. 
It is evident that in spite of being a civil 
servant of the British Empire Philby had a special love 
for Arab independence. He did whatever he could do.in 
his official capacity to further the Arab cause in Iraq 
and Trans-Jordan. He had welcomed the Anglo-French Decla-
ration in the hope that it will provide an opportunity 
1. Ibid. P. 84. 
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to the Arabs to form and run their own indepenaent 
governments. But his optimism and sanguinity were 
frustrated, first in Mesopotamia and next in Transjordan 
He resigned when, he saw that he could nolonger work 
freely for the cause of the Arabs. However his resignation 
opened a new chapter in his life. 
PHILBY'S RESIGNATION AND STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM 
In his letter of resignation philby had stated 
that he was leaving the Government service in order to 
have full freedom to criticise the wrong policies of imperi-
alist powers, . specially Britain. As a result between 
1924 and 1925 he wrote a number of articles and delivered 
addresses to select audiences in be which he bitterly 
criticised Britain's imperial policies and practices 
in the Arab Fertile Crescent. The thrust of these articles 
and speeches was that France and Britain had broken their 
word when the former turned Faisal out of Damascus at 
gun point and the later denied the inhabitants of Iraq and 
Trans-Jordan the right to self determination. He found 
ready audiences to hear and share his views. For there 
were a number of people who felt uneasy with the policies 
1. Ibid. P. 235. 
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of their Government in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent. 
Such people rushed to hear his accounts of events in Iraq, 
Palestine and Trans-jordan which were greatly different 
from the projections of the Government, 
Philby severed his connection with the Government 
in 1924 and since then always remained at logger heads 
with the British authorities. His post resignation life 
can be described, to a great extent, as a vfriting and 
academic career, devoted largely to the furtherance of 
Arab cause. In all his works - travelogues, journalistic 
articles and serious academic works - the theme of Arab 
independence versus British imperialism is recurrent and 
merits to be studied seriously. 
In Philby's time imperialism was in full swing bcth 
in Africa and Asia, But as an Arbophile he was mainly 
concerned with the practice and effects of imperialism 
in the Arab world. Anything that in any way affected the 
cause of Arab independence came under his severe criticism, 
There is a problem with Philby's style of writing. 
He does not fallow an academic or intellectual method. 
Infact he takes up an issue or event and discusses it with 
a view to showing the reader the nefarious designs of 
imperialism, British or French. The advantage with this 
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method is that it greatly clarifies the point in 
question, but also makes a verbose readingo Another 
problem is that he is concerned with a lot of issues 
and has rarely discussed them with precision and brevity, 
hence one has to be selective and to the point. 
Philby was, nodoubt, a die-hard critic of Britain's 
imperial policies. But the later, too, seemed equally 
determined to provide him with fresh ammunitions from time 
to time to revive his criticism. He had hardly finished 
his campaign against the wrong policies of the Government 
I 
in the mandated territories when the later annexed to 
Transjordan the districts of Aqaba and Maan in northern 
Hijaz in July 1925, Infact when the war began between 
King Husayn and Ibn Saud for domination in Arabia Great 
Britain had categorically declared to observe complete 
neutrality. But they broke their word, and were greatly 
alarmed when they saw that Ibn Saud was destined to out-
play King Husayn and put an end for ever to the Hashimite 
rule in Arabia, The reason for ti eir alarm was obvious• 
Transjordan was important for Britain in order to safe-
guard its militory and economic interest in the Suez 
Canal and Red Sea Zone_, Only when it had free and easy 
access to the port of Aqaba, the country's only outlet 
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in the warm waters. Britain expected no trouble or 
hindrance when the father and the son, Husayn and 
Abdullah, were undiputed masters of the Hijaz and Trans-
jordan respectively. But the moment Ibn Saud, who was 
also an ally and friend of Britain but less amenable, 
threatened to occupy the Hijaz the British authorities 
decided to annex the area in question. Ibn Saud protested 
and refused to recognize the British mandate over Palestine 
and Iraq but of no avail, 
Philby took this opportunity for a new campaign 
against the British Government, He denounced the annexa-
tion as an unpardonable act of aggression against a weak 
nation. He vehemently argued that the annexed districts ' 
belonged to Ibn Saud's realms and that the Great Britain 
had no justification for its sordid action. The imperia-
list Britain,in lis opinion, had done yet another injustice 
to an independent Arab state. 
The never say die imperialism, which was the back-
bone of Britain's foreign policy, can be sustained only 
by pursuing a policy of territorial expantion, Expantionism 
always involves the enchroachment on the rights and 
independence of unprivileged people and their subjection 
to economic exploitation and political oppression. This 
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is precisely what philby witnessed and gathered during 
his travels in Hadhramaut and in the neighbouring valleys 
and towns. 
Infact in 193b Philby was exploring the romantic 
land of Shabwa which according to his reckoning was 
independent and out of the sphere of the Aden Protectorates. 
But the imperialist Brictain would not accept his thesis 
or argument. In the like manner Philby would not tolerate' 
any enchroachment on the freedom and territories of inde-
pendent inhabitants of Hadhramant and Shabwa, Rather he 
would prefer to expose the inherent weaknesses of the British 
claim on the areas in question. 
First of all he questioned the legitimacy of the 
Aden Protectorates Order of 1937 which annexed to the 
British Empire about 70,000 square miles of the Aden hinter-
land which, according to Philby, was independent. He based 
his argument on Husayn-^^cMahon correspondence in which it 
was clearly stated that, besides the 9,000 square miles 
controlled by the Aden based British authorities the rest 
of the country would be an independent entity© In other 
words it belonged to the area of Arab independence as 
promised and chalked out in Husayn-McMahon correspondence. 
1. See Philby, Sheba's Daughters, op. cit. PP.231-233. 
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Philby further expounded his thesis by quoting 
from the conversations and interviews he had with 
the people in and around Shabwa : 
'By the by', I said to Salih, 'the British 
authorities in Aden informed me oy telegram 
when I was at Mukallah that Shabwa and the 
Karab country lie within the jurisdiction of 
the Aulaqi Sultan, Tell me if that is correct. 
'Nonsense' he replied, 'the pack of liars, 
This is our country and we own no ruler but 
ourselves,' The Sultan of Shibam had also 
scouted the idea, and considered Shabwa within 
his sphere of influence, though not under his 
rule,'-'^  
Philby, then, rightly ridicules the idea and 
method of protection employed by the British in the so-
called Ader, protectorates. There was chaos and disorder 
all over the land he visited. The mismanagement and mala-
dministration was more evident in the so-called protected 
territories. By the time he had visited the area there 
was no wireless station, no telegraph office and no postal 
organisation0 Apart, indeed, from the laying out of 
landing grounds in certain localities' on the coast and 
in the interior for the benefit of the Royal Air Force 
at Aden, I can not recollect a single genuine contribution 
made by British protection to the progress and prosperity 
1. Ibid. P. 306 , 
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of Hadhramaut*. And those aerodromes were not meant for 
public transport. Rather they were provided to the Royal 
Air Force for bombing the tribal concentrations and 
villages in order to terrify the so-called'unruly' tribes 
and force them into obedience.^ Philby rightly questions 
the legitimacy of employing such inhuman and barbarous 
methods for securing the allegiance of independent tribes. 
He was to the point when he remarked : 
'British protection is surely a misnomer. 
So far as the Aden Protectorate is conce-
rnedj It is ineffectual even to protect 
its own nominees from insult or injury 
if they stray from the beaten paths.,. 
The simple fact is that these Arabs, 
independent since the days of the 
old Hymyarite empire, have no desire 
to be lorded over by foreigners ~ 
aliens by race and aliens by religion. 
To them foreign penetration is synonymous 
with exploitation. To them their wretched 
salt is riches, the antiques burried in 
their earth are a source of fabulous 
wealth. The foreigner comes to spy out 
their lana and to annex if it is worth 
3 
his while, 
1. Ibid. P. 236, 
2. ^bid. PP, 3o3-304. Also see Philby,'Bombing in the Aden 
Protectorates' Wolrd Review.London.January. 1938 pp. 
Also see Philby,Stop Bombing in Arabia..World Review. 
London, April 1938, pp. 30-33. 
3. Philby, Sheba's Daughters, op.cit. P. 237. 
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The last major issue on which Philby had had diffe-
rences with theBritish Government was the Suez Canal Crisis. 
Nasser brought about his revolution in 1952 without facing 
XX any serious difficultyo But he soon realized that sus-
taining the revolution as a harbinger of a new era wos not 
an easy tasko He had numerous problems to solve. But 
the greatest challenge that he was facing was to improve 
the economic condition of the common Egyptians, To achieve 
this purpose he needed generous foreign help. Hard pressed 
for funds he decided to borrow from the Western countries. 
He asked for over a billion dollars to enlarge the High 
Aswan Dam in Upper Egypt in order to increase the country's 
irrigating capacity for cultivating additional land to 
produce enough food to feed the teeming population of his 
countryo The United States in collaboration with the 
World Bank and Great Britain agreed to provide the required 
fund. But Nasser did not accept it immediately. He deli-
berately indulged in procrastinating tactics in the hope 
that he might get a better deal by using the rivalry 
between Russia and the West, Meanwhile he took several 
steps such as training of the special commandos(Fedayi'in) 
to attack Israel, cultural and commercial pacts with China 
flirtation with Russia and above all his anti-Americanism 
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which irritated many Congressmen, Under their pressure 
the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles cancelled the 
loan project in July 1956 despite the fact that by that 
time Nasser seemed ready to accept the offer. Dulles' 
main intention behind cancelling the loan deal was to 
humiliate Nasser, 
But Nasser was not to be easily rebuffed. He reacted 
swiftly and boldly by nationalizing the Suez Canal which 
was being operated by the Suez Canal Company, founded 
in 1854. According to an agreement the Company had conc-
essions to operate the canal for a period of 99 years. 
Nasser did not care for the agreement. 
The reaction of the West was expectedly hostile, 
irrational and smacked of an attitude deeply rooted in 
their long cultivated imperialism. They complained of 
Egypt's inability to run the canal and to behave respon-
sibly in the comity of nations. Hence they decided not to 
allow Egypt to have its thumb on Europe's wind pipe, France 
and Britain put all kind of pressure on Nasser to toe the 
line. They froze Egyptian assets, ordered their ships 
r,ot to pay the regular dues to the nationalized company 
and stcirted a large scale military preparation to attack 
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Egypt. . Moreover on October 5, 1956 they took the 
matter to the U.N, Security Council, The Council, after 
due deliberations, issued a set of six principles to run 
the canal properly. All the concerned parties including 
Britain and France accepted those principles. But the Anglo-
French acceptance was a ruse. For on October 29, 1956 
they, along with Israel invaded Egypt aiming at Nasser's 
fall from power.Both Russia and the United States condemned 
the invasion. The condemnation of the two Super Powers was 
too Strang to be ignored, ^ s a result the invading forces 
withdrew from the Egyptian territories in March 1957. 
Within a month after the withdrawal the Egyptian engineers 
cleared the canal of the ships which the Egyptian army 
had sunk to prevent it from being used by the enemy forces. 
Thus they showed the world that contrary to the Western 
charge they were competent enough to run the canal properly. 
Throughout this period of crisis Philby WoS busy 
fighting a war for Egypt on a different front. Hearing 
the news of nationalization of the canal and the subsequent 
events he snatched up his pen and flooded the Arab and 
radical British press with articles and letters justifying 
Egypt's right to nationalize the canal and condemning the 
invasion in strongest words. Many of his articles could 
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not be published because they were too long for a newspaper, 
However, the Beirut based Daily Star found his 'Eden arfd 
the Suez Canal' sufficiently thought provoiing and 
published it in three instalments in its issues of August 
15th, 16th and 17th,1956. Later he collected all his 
published and unpublished articles in a single volume, 
namely, Suez and All that' which, too, was not accepted 
by any publisher for publication, mainly because of its 
anti-West tone and harsh criticism of ^gle-^rench 
imperialism. Be that as it may the main thrust of those 
articles was that Egypt had a right to nationalize the 
canal in the name of Egyptian pride and dignity. Moreover 
he condemned the invasion of Egypt by the three powers, 
Britain, France and Israel as a sinister design to revive 
the old-fashioned imperialism and to deprive Egypt of her 
right to run its own affairso On the other hand he was all 
praise for Egyptians' ability and competence to run the 
canal without Western help. He took it as a further 
justification for and vindication of his life long stand 
and belief in the ability of Arabs to run independent 
states. 
Towards the end of his life Philby was happy to 
see that the world realities had changed and that most 
sm 
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Arab states had become independent. But there had emerged 
new problems as well. The most dangerous of them all was 
the Arab-Israel conflict which had become and still is 
a perenial source of trouble and humiliation for the 
Arabs, mainly because of their internal differences and 
disunity. But for Philby it was still the neoimperiali 
of the West that threatened most the Arab world. To h 
the panacea for these and other ailments lay in the Arab 
unity. He summed up his life-long stand and struggle 
against imperialism in a letter that he wrote to the 
legendry Glubb Pasha of Jordan : 
The line that divides me from you 
and your ilk is your conviction that 
the best interests of these Arab countries 
can only be served in some form of 
subordination to British imperial 
policy sweetened b> lavish British 
financial aid, whereas I am equally 
convinced that only in unity inter se 
can the Arabs ever realize their destiny 
....Perhaps you will not agree with 
me that your case is lost beyond recall. 
1. As quoted in Monroe, E. Philby of Arabia, op.cit.P.291-29 
CHAPTER - II 
Philby's stand on palestine problem besides being 
embarrassing and appaling for the Arabs is marked by 
glaring inconsistencies. It is common knowledge that an 
individual is powerless to influence the policies and 
decisions of a government or the public opinion unless 
he has compact ideas and an equally convincing method 
or means to present them before the people in order to 
win their support, moral or material. Philby lacked both. 
Hence it is not surprising that he failed to convince 
the West, specially the British policy makers on the one 
hand and impaired many of his friendships with the Arabs 
on the other. 
Philby's activities in respv-ect of the Palestine 
issue as in case of the Arab independence were both inte-
llectual and practical. That he did some practical works 
to solve the problem according to his own vision and 
occasionally expressed his views in writing or through 
his speeches on the Balfour Declaration, the Partition 
Plan and the Jewish right to return to and settle in 
Pa lestine. 
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ORIGIN OF PLAESTINE PROBLfcM 
It will be appropriate and immensely useful to 
know in brief the background and origin of the Balfour 
Declaratiori which figures prominently in every discussion 
on Palestine problem. 
The Balfour Declaration nodoubt marks the beginning 
of the problem. But the seeds of the problem were sown 
in the last quarter of the Nineteenth century,!hat was 
the time when political Zionism came to the surface. 
In 1896 Theodore Herzl wrote his famous book The Jewish 
2 
State in which he first expounded his ideas and gave 
them final shape a year later in the first World Zionist 
Congress which was held in Basle, His ideas can be summarized 
as follows; first, the Jews regardless of their country 
or nationality are one people; second they have been per-
secuted everywhere; and third, they can not be assimi-
lated by the nations or countries in which they live, 
(The same position is adopted by the racists and anti-
Semites as well), 
Herzl's ideas led him to draw three conclusions: 
first, he rejected assimilation outright and advocated 
a separate distinct Jewish identity; second, he presented 
lo For a discussion on teligious as well as political 
Zionism see Roger Garaudy, The Case of Israel,London, 
1983, pp, 6-9 
2. Herzl, Theodore, The Jewish State. New York, 1946, 
Originally this book was Written in German language 
and published in Vienna in 1896. 
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the idea of a Jewish State in order to put an end to the 
persecution to which the Jews were subjected, -specially 
in the European countries and Russian Empirej third, 
he argued that since the Jews are scattered all over the 
world and are nowhere in majority they should be brought 
from every part of the world in a vacant place to set up 
a state of their own. 
Naturally the search began for a vacant piece of 
land. Noted Zionists such as Britain and Baron Hirsch 
suggested Uganda and Argentina as the prospective lands 
where a Jewish state could be created. But Herzl himself 
was in favour of Palestine, For Palestine as the birth 
place of Judaism had special attraction for the Jews 
living in diaspora, Herzl, infact, wanted to exploit the 
religious sentiments of the Jewish people to serve his 
purely political ends. 
But Palestine was not a vacant land. It was already 
inhabited by the Palestinian Arabs and a Jewish State 
could be established at the cost df their evacuation only. 
This was not disturbing for the Zionists. Nineteenth 
century was the era of ugly colonialism and the Zionists 
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were children of their age. In their view resembling 
that of the colonialists, the native Arabs were not 
worth a damn. In his book The Zionist Connection Alfred 
Lilienthal has quoted Weizmann as having said in response 
to a question about the Palestinian Arabs : 
'What Arabs? They are hardly 
of any consequence'. 
Other Zionists went a step ahead. They created a 
myth and propagated it throughout Europe and America that 
Palestine was noman's land but simply a desert which 
produced nothing. We must pause here to expose this white 
lie. According to the cencus taken by the British Govern-
ment on December 31,1922 there were 757,000 inhabitants 
altogether in Palestine of whom 590,000 were Muslim 
Arabs, 73,000 christian Arabs and 83,000 Jews, Thus the 
grand total of Muslim and Christian Arabs was 663,000, 
that is, over 88 per cent of the population whereas the 
Jews constituted only 11 per cent of the total population. 
Further more, contrary to the Zionist claim, 
Palestine was an agricultural land which produced, even 
exported grain and citrus fruits. Before the Zionists came 
1. As quoted in Lilienthal, Alfred, The Zonist Connection, 
New York, 1978. P. 341, 
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in the land Palestinian farmers used to export 30,000 
tonnes of wheat per year. Likewise the area of Arab 
owned orchards increased three fold between 1921 and 
1941, that of the groves where citrus fruits, .specially 
oranges were grown increased seven fold between 1922 
and 1947 and the production of vegetables increased tenfold 
in 1938 in comparision with that of 1922. Keeping in view 
the rapid growth of orange groves the Peel commission 
Report which was presented to the British Parliament in 
July 1937 made an estimate that 'of the 30,000,000 cases 
of winter oranges by which world production was expected 
to increase in the following ten years the producers 
and exporters would be as follows'. 
Palestine 15,000,000 
U.S.A. 7,000,000 
Spain 5,000,000 
Other countries 3,000,000 
(Cyprus, Egypt Algeria etc.) 
But inspite of this glaring reality the British 
Government under the pressure of the Zionists decided 
to 'view with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people' and promiseci 
1. Garaudy, Roger, The Case of Israel, op, cit. P, 39. 
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through the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that it'will use 
their endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this 
object.' However, Balfour also made it clear that'nothing 
shall be done which nay prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. 
The Balfour Declaration manifests the ugliest face 
of colonialism. It implies to do injustice to a nation 
in order to do a favour to another, Arthur koestler was 
to the point when he said:One nation solemnly promised 
2 
to a second nation the country of a third nation*. 
Infact the Balfour Declaration stands prominent 
among the injustices done to the Arabs. It marks the 
realization of the Jewish dream for a national home on 
the one hand and opened a hell of problems and miseries 
for the Palestinians on the other, 
PHILBY'S STAND 
Philby was nodoubt a man of conscience. He always 
tried to side with truth and justice and condemn the wrong 
in an unequivocal manner. However, his stand and views on 
the Balfour Declaration seem to be inconsistent. On the 
one hand he condemns the Declaration as *an act of betrayal 
1. See the text of the Balfour Declaration in Europa pub. 
The Middle East and North Africa 1988, London 1987.P.64. 
2. Koestler, Arthur, Promise and Fulfilment. London, 1949, 
P, 4. 
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for whose parallel, the sheKels and the Kiss and all 
the rest of it we have to go back, to the garden of 
Gethsemane. and on the other he justifies the Jewish 
right to return to and settle in Palestine : 
'I hope I may be permitted in all 
seriousness to dispel the notion that 
I am in any sense hostile to the 
ideals of Zionism, In the first place, 
I genuinely respect and admire the 
Spirit which inspires the Jews in 
their communities scattered over the 
face of the earth to return to the 
land of their ancestors with the object 
of building up therein a national home-
Palestine having been freed from the 
domination of the Turk by the Allied 
forces, the right of immigration in to 
it is open to all persons and classes 
without distinction, subject only to the 
capacity of the country to receive and 
absorb them..,,For the Jews particularly 
that right is guaranteed by international 
2 
engagements, 
1. Koestler, Arthur, Promise and Fulfilment. London, 
1949. Po 4. 
2. Philby, Trans-Jordan, op. Cit. P. 299. 
Surprisingly in his Arabian Jubilee published in 1952 
Philby claims to have nover justified the Jewish right 
to return to Palestine: 
*I have always held, and still hold, that the Jews,in 
whose favour the Balfour Declaration and the man^ 
date were drafted, have no shadow of legal or 
moral right to go to Palestine*^abian Jubilee, 
P. 209). 
The contradiction in the two statements is too obvious 
to be ignored. 
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It is clear that Philby allowed himself to be 
easily influenced by the myths of historical and biblical 
rights concocted and advanced by the Zionist Jews in 
order to create a Jewish state in Palestine. He never 
subjected this erroneous Jewish thesis to any intellectual 
or critical scrutiny.Furthermore he failed to understand 
the real nature of Zionism and as a result claimed'that 
the advent of the Jews to the scenes of their fathers' 
exploits will be advantageous to themselves and to their 
Arab neighbours' . By this he meant the Jewish skill and 
expertise in modern techniques of agriculture and mech-
anized industry and their huge financial resources 
which,in his opinion, were bound to bring prosperity 
to the region. But what he could not realize was that 
the things he regarded as harbinger of prosperity can 
also become a tool for economic and political subor-
dination of the Palestinian Arabs, He missed this point 
completely. But there were men of insight among his 
own contemporaries who were well informed and understood 
the implications of political Zionism very well. In 
1919 Lord Curzen ably exposed the real designs of the 
Zionists in Palestine; 
1. For a detailed study of various myths advanced by 
the Zionists see Garaudy, Roger, The case of Israel, 
op cit. pp. 29-86. 
2. Philby, *Trans-Jordan*,op. cit. p. 299, 
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'While Weizmann may say one thing to you, or 
while you may mean one thing by a National 
Home, he is out for something quite different* 
^e contemplates a Jewish state, Jewish nation, 
a subordinate population of Arabs etc., ruled 
by Jews. He is trying to effect this behind the 
screen and under the shelter of British 
trusteeship.' 
Arabs too were fully aware that what a Jewish 
state would mean for Palestinians and that is why they 
strongly protested to the British when the later issued 
the Balfour Declaration. King Husayn, the then Arab 
leader criticised the Declaration as a breach of promise* 
However, he was won over and assured by the British that 
a Jewish national state would be created only if it were 
'compatible with the freedom of the existing population, 
both economic and political. But the leaders who emerged 
on the Arab political scene after Husayn and his sons 
were consistent in their realization of the dangerous 
consecjuences of the Balfour Declaration and refused to 
be influenced by hollow British assurances. Philby's 
own hero, Ibn Saud with whom he had had opportunities 
1. As quoted in Garaudy, Roger, The Case of Israel. 
op.cit. p. 48. 
2. Armajaoi, Yahya, Middle East Past and Present, op.cit 
P. 232. 
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to discuss the matter time and again, was vehemently 
opposed to the creation of a Jewish state. For it threa-
tened to eliminate the native Arabs from their own 
land where they had been rooted for centuries. 
But in Philby's opinion 'the true basis of Arab 
hostility to Jewish immigration in to Palestine today 
is xenophobia, and instinctive perception of the fact 
that the vast majority of tlie central and eastern European 
Jews, seeking admission into Palestine owing to persecusion 
in their own count ies, are not Semites at all...Whatever 
the political repercussions of their settlement in 
Palestine may be, their advent is regarded as a menace 
to the Semitic culture of Arabia,,,,The true Semetic 
Jews of the two Dispersions have had little to complain 
of in the Arab lands, in which they have been settled 
for nearly 2,500 years, for the simple reasons that 
they are heirs of a culture similar to that of their 
l)Osts. But the European Jew of today, with his secular 
outlook and his repulsive foreign ways, is regarded 
as a stranger and an unwelcome intruder within the 
gates of Arabia*. 
1, Philby, Arabian Jubilee, op. cit. P, 204. 
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The charge of xenophobia seems to be Philby's 
personal opinion. Infact it was not merely xenophobia 
that led the Arabs to oppose the massive immigration of 
the Jews into Palestine. But, as explained already, it 
was the fear of economic subordination to the Jews on 
the one hand and the fear of being permanently replaced 
or of being rendered a minority in their own land on the 
other that led the Arabs to resent and rise in rebellion 
against all efforts directed to the establishment of 
the Jewish State. 
But Philby-was thoroughly right in his assertion 
that a great majority of the European Jews was not of 
Semitic origin. His claim has been suported by other 
sources. Maxime Rodinson has rightly remarked: 
'It is very probable - and physical anthropology 
tends to show that it is true - that the so-called 
Arab inhabitants of Palestine(a majority of whom, 
moreover, are people who have become Arab)'have 
much more of the ancient Hebrews''blood'than 
most of the Jews of Diaspora, whose religious 
exclusiveness in no way prevented them from 
absorbing converts of various origin. 
For centuries Jewish proselytism was impor-
tant even in Western Europe, and was continued 
else where over long periods of time.,,.. 
And, from an anthropological point of view, 
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a glance at any meeting of Jews from 
different backgrounds will suffice to give 
an idea of the importance of foreign 
contributions. 
Thomas Kiernan was more emphatic and to the point 
when he remarked : 
'Anthropologists concluded,...that the eastern 
European Jewish inventors of Zionism had 
2 
little or no biological connexion to Palestine, 
But political demagogues rarely or never heed to 
intellectual and historical realities. They ignore all 
to 
reason and wisdom and make no attempt/distinguish between 
right and wrong when they decide to achieve their poli-
tical objectives. This was precisely what the British 
did to realize the farcical ideals of Zionism, disregarding 
all Arab opposition, political, intellectual and moral. 
Palestine problem, as indicated already, dates 
back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. In the beginning 
there was merely fear and apprehension among the Arabs, 
But it acquired a dangerous proportion when Britain 
became mandatory over Palestine and began, with the full 
1. Rodinson, Maxime, Israel;A Colonial Settler State, 
New York, 1973, pp, 79-80. 
2, As quoted in Garaud Roger, The Case of Israel, op. 
cit, P, 46. 
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blessing of the League of Nations, to facilitate 
Jewish immigration into it on a massive scale. The 
Palestinians were naturally alarmed and as a result there 
were numerous uprisings directed against the nefarious 
designs of the Z ionists and the British, 
As Palestine was under British Mandate it was 
natural that they would try to solve the problem. In 
July 1937 the Peel Commission or the Palestine Royal 
Commission which wos set up in 1936 by the British 
Government prepared a comprehensive report that deals 
with every aspect of the problem. The report is, infact, 
divided into three parts, the first deals with the. 
ancient and modern history of Palestine, the second 
with the working of the British Mandate, and the third 
with the conclusions and recommendations of the Commi-
ssion. Philby was mainly concerned with the final part 
of the report. In his opinion the commission had rightly 
decided to terminate the Mandate in favour of some other 
arrangement. This 'other arrangement in the view of 
the Commission was as follows : 
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'Under Treaties to be negotiated by the 
Mandatory withthe Government of Trans-
jordan and representatives of the Arabs 
of Palestine on the one hand, and with the 
Zionist Organization on the other, it would 
be declared that two sovereign independent 
States would shortly be established — 
(1) an Arab State consisting of Transjordan 
united with that part of Palestine alloted 
to the Arabs,(2) a Jewish State consisting 
of that part of Palestine alloted to the 
Jews... A new Mandate should be instituted 
to execute the trust of maintaining the 
sanctity of Jerusalam and Bethlehem and 
ensuring free and safe access to them for 
all the world. 
PHILBV WELCOMES THE REPORT 
These recommendations were welcome neither by 
2 
Jews nor by Arabs. But Philby accepted them with slight 
modifications and urged the Arabs to do so. For the 
Commission's recommendations, in his opinion, were 
greatly favourable to them and in their own interest 
1. Europa Pub. The Middle East and North Africa 1988 
op. cit..p.68, 
2. See for details about Jewish and Arab complains and 
Philby's response to them.Philby.The Palestine Problem 
in the Contemporary Review, London"^  (September) 1937, 
PP. 260-269. 
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they should'take with open hands what is offered, seeing 
that it gives them twenty-three parts out of twenty 
four'. In another place he presented his arguments with 
more clarity and straight forwardness : 
'The Arabs are bad bargainers. In this case 
nine-tenths of their full demands have been 
conceded. They reject the concession in the hope 
of getting ten-tenths. It is inconceivable that 
they should get that. It is conceivable that 
they may lose what is now offered. Yet they 
persist in their obstinate refusal. By accep-
ting the scheme in principle they could secure 
substantial modifications in their favour. By 
opposing it tooth and nail they may find them-
selves confronted with the choice between the 
2 
scheme as it stands and nothing at all'. 
This suggestion or warning of Philby to the Arabs 
as he himself put it 'was based on expediency rather 
than on the legal or moral merits of the Arab case 
against the admission of Jews into Palestine*. He had 
realized well that the Western powers ^specially Britain 
1. Philby, The Palestine problem, in the Contemporary 
Review op. cit.P, 261, 
2. The Ardbs and the Future of Palestine, in 
Foreign Affairs New York (October) 1937, pp.162-163. 
3. Philby, Arabian Jubille. New York, 1953, P. 209, 
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and the United States had little or no genuine sympathy 
with the Arab cause. Moreover the public opinion in the 
two countries was greatly in favour of the Jews mainly 
owing to the massive propaganda of the Zionists. Besides 
this, the Arabs themselves had nothing or little in their 
possession to change the course of .the events or the 
minds of the Western countries which were supporting the 
Jewish case. It was in this perspective that Philby 
advised them to accept the compromise that was being 
offered to them in the form of the partition scheme as 
recommended by the Peel Commisson, 
HIS DIFFERENCES WITH IBN SAUD 
But to the Arab^ -specially to Ibn Saud his views 
were an anathema. They accused that he was pro-Zionist 
and that he had little sympathy for the original inha-
bitants of Palestine whose beloved country was being 
snatched away from them in order to be handed over to 
their enemies, the Jews, 
But Philby was not to be deterred by any criticism, 
right or wrong. He went on spreading his views through 
71 -
his articles and addresses. Since he had special relations 
with Ibn Saud many people, both in Arabia and in the 
West, began to think that he was representing the views 
of the Apabian Monarch. Ibn Saud was alarmed and emba-
rrassied so much so that he instructed his embassies in Cairo 
and London to delcare through the press that his dealings 
with Philby were purely personal and commercial and that 
he had not authorized the later to speak or write on his 
behalf : 
'Some may think that Philby's opinions 
reflect our own...As for his personal 
opinions, they are his own and do not 
reflect our thoughts at all. 
Philby, too, hastened to confirm that he was fully 
in agreement 'with all that has been publically stated 
by the Saudi Arabian Embassy about me, and that I have 
never in the whole of the last twenty years expressed 
any but my personal opinion, I am pleased to have this 
opoortunity to affirm that neither now nor in the past 
have I had any official or semi-official connection of 
any kind with His Majesty, my admiration for him is 
another matter'. Thus the air was cleared and confusion 
1. As quoted in Monroe, E. Philby of Arabia, op, cit 
P. 214. 
2. Ibid. pp. 214-215. 
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ended. However, Philby continued to believe in his 
worth and ability and that a day will come when he will 
play his role to solve the intricate Palestine problem. 
A PHILBY PLAN 
, H'e had not to wait for long. In 
early 1939 Ibn Saud asked him to help the Saudi dele-
gation which was in London to attend the Palestine Round 
Table Conference. During the course of the conference he 
chalked out a fresh'Philby plan* to solve the problem 
under discussion. He was so much optimistic about the 
prospects of the success of his plan that he asked many 
officials with whom he was acquainted to convey it to 
the British Prime Minister. He also discussed it with 
the Jews and atleast with one Arab, Fuad Hamza, a Saudi 
delegate who was in London to attend the said conference. 
The plan as he explained in one of his letters to his 
wife, Dora, was as follows : 
•I had a secret lunch party at Acol Road -
Dr. Weizmann and Bengurian to meet Fuad 
Hamza. We are to have another meeting at 
Acol Road to continue the talk, the idea being 
roughly to get Faisal in as King of Palestine 
with some quid pro quo in the way of Jewish 
immigration - Say^50,000 in the next five 
1 years. 
Weizmann was agog with Philby's idea and extended 
his full support. But Fuad Hamza kept silence and showed 
1. Ibid. P. 219 
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no enthusiasm. As a result, and unlike Philby's expectation 
no second meeting could take place. 
The upshot of Philby's plan was that the Arab 
opposition to Jewish immigration and the subsequent 
creation of a Zionist State can be overcome through 
generous financial assistance. In all his plans on 
Palestine he seems to have been obsessed with the idea 
that Arabs were easily purchasable; even Ibn Saud was 
easy to buy. One wonders how little much he had understood 
the Arabian King despite his long friendship and asso-
ciation with him. 
In the early phase of the Second Wolrd War Philby 
reckoned that if this war was to last long like the 
previous Great War it will put Ibn Saud in a tight corner. 
For, on the onehand pilgrims will cease to come to 
Arabia from various parts of the world and on the other 
it will become difficult, if npt impossible for the Saudis 
to export their oil to the countries which can buy and 
pay for it. Thus the two major source of Ibn Saud's 
incorr.e will be rendered defunct, Philby thought that Ibn 
Saud, hard pressed for funds to run his Xingdom, can be 
persuaded to accept the Arabs of Palestine (who will 
evacuate their country for the migrant Jews) in his 
kingdom or else where in the Arab world in return for a 
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subsidy of a few million pounds. 
This so-called'Philby plan' in his own words 
was as follows : 
*The whole of Palestine should be left to the 
Jews, All Arabs displaced therefrom should be 
resettled else where at the expense of the Jews 
who would place a sum of i 20 millions at 
the disposal of King Ibn Saud for this purpose. 
Ail other Asiatic Arab countries, with the sole 
exception of Aden should be formally recognized 
as completely independent in the proper sense 
of theterm. These arrangements were to be 
proposed to king Ibn Saud, as the principal 
Arab ruler, by Britain and America, and 
guaranteed jointly by them in the event of 
their acceptance by him on behalf of the Arabs, 
With this view in mind Philby presented his plan 
to the Zionist leaders such as Weizmann, the then 
president of World Zionist Organization and of the Jewish 
Agency, Moshe Shertok, Secretary of the Jewish Agency 
and Lewis Namier, ^rofessor of Modern History in the 
University of Manchester, The three Zionist leaders , 
Philby.Arabian Jubilee, op. cit. PP, 212-213. 
Dr. Weizmann has also recorded the minutes of his 
meeting and conversations with Philby in his antobio-
graphy, Trial and Error. In Arabian Jubilee Philby 
contradicted some of Weizmann's accounts. But these 
are minor differences which figure only in the 
details and do not affect the main content. 
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readily accepted the scheme. It was then decided that 
Philby would go to Saudi Arabia to secure the support 
of Ibn Saud for his plan and Weizmann will discuss the 
matter with President Roosevelt during his visit to 
America that he was soon to undertake,. 
Philby broached his plan to Ibn Saud in January 
1940. The king gave no answer, kept silence and asked 
Philby not to mention it to anybody else. It is, howfever 
difficult to say that whether he was in favour of the 
plan or was he angered at Weizmann's offer of bribe as 
he later explained it. As far Philby is concerned be 
took the King's silence as an approval of his scheme. 
He wrote to Dora : 
'Ibn Saud....still won't say yes and won't 
say no. The truth is that he himself is quite 
favourably inclined^ towards the proposal 
and is just thinking out how it can be 
worked without producing a howl of anger 
among certain Arab elements.... Dr. W, can go 
on with his idea and work up the American iide 
of th>' scheme but we may have to wait for a 
bit for a favourable opportunity of putting it 
in to practice. Of course he (Ibn Saud) 
doesn't want to be accused of Sacrificing 
1 
Arab interests to his own amfijitions ' 
1. As quoted in Monroe, E, Philby of Arabia, op, cit 
PP. 222-223. 
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In the same year: 1940 Weizmann discussed the 
socalled Philby plan with President Roosevelt who 
responded with little enthusiasm. But Weizmann raised 
the mattfer once again in 1943 and succeeded to persuade 
the President to hold a conference which will be attended, 
among other?,by Winston Churchil, Ibn Saud and the Pre-
sident himself. As a result Colonel Hoskins, an excellent 
Arabist, was dispatched to Riyadh to know the mind of 
Ibn Saud. (It should be noted that Hoskins was not aware 
of the 'Philby plan' before his meeting with Ibn Saud). 
Soon after his arrival in Riyadh he raised the matter 
with the King and enquired whether he (Ibn Saud) would 
agree to meet Weizmann. To Hoskins' astonishment Ibn 
Saud exploded at the mention of Weizmann saying that 
he hated the Zionist leader for he (Weizmann) had 
offered him bribe if he would accept the Arab migrants 
from the Palestine.' 
It is clear that Philby had thoroughly misinter 
preted the King's silence as the later's approval of his 
scheme. But he would not accept his mistake. On 15 Nov-
ember, 1943 he had a long session with Hoskins at Brown's 
Hoiel in London and tried to convince the later that 
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he was not out of favour in Saudi Arabia and that he 
had not misinterpreted or misrepresented the King's 
view, hence his plan was still workable. He also complained 
that his plan was not presented to the king in the way 
it should have been according to the original scheme. 
He ended his dialogue with Hoskins on the following note: 
'His (Hoskins') account of his conversations 
with King Ibn Saud had not in the least 
shaken my conviction - a conviction on 
which I was prepared to stake my whole 
reputation, which was all I had to stake 
as I had already sacrificed my career by 
my fight for Arab independence that had 
he gone out to Arabia with President Roosevelt's 
firm offer made on behalf of the American 
and British governments on the lines of the 
plan,' that offer would have been accepted. 
Not only philby Weizmann, too, inspite of having 
been chided by Hoskins on his acceptance of the 'Philby 
plan' remained optimistic for quite a long time. He 
wrote to a friend in December 1943: 
'It (Philby plan) is conceived on big lines, 
large enough to satisfy the legitimate 
aspirations of both Arabs and Jews, and 
the stretegic and economic interests of 
1, Ibid. PP, 224-225. 
78 -
the United States and Britainj,., 
properly managed, Mr, Philby's scheme 
offers an approach which should not be 
abandoned without further exploration. 
But to the men in power, both in 'Vnerica and Britain 
the scheme was unworkable, hence could not be explored 
further as wished by Weizmann, Infact both Philby and 
Weizmann were wide off the mark. Because by the end of 
1943 political and economic realities in Palestine had 
changed drastically making Ix mighty clear that any plan 
such as that of Philby was bound to be frustrated by 
those elements, both among the Jews and the Arabs, who 
had taken things in their hand and were little inclined 
or completely unwilling to accept any compromise. More-
over, it should also be noted that by the time Philby 
was engaged in advancing his plan Weizmann had lost control 
over the redical and militant Zionists who had been launcj^ -
ing terrorist attacks on the Arab populations as well 
as the British Army.o In view of the growing militancy 
among the Jews it is hard to believe that Weizmann would 
have succeeded inhis plan of compromise. Besides this, 
1. Ibid. P, 225. 
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even if one goes along with Philby in believing that 
Ibn Saud had approved of his plan in early 1940 it is 
hard to perceive that he would have accepted such a 
scheme in 1943 when Saudi Arabia's fortune had begun 
to change and the signs of prosperity had started to 
appear on the horizon, first due to the generous financial 
aid from America and Britain and next owing to the oil 
riches which were increasing at an amazing pace. In the 
fianal analysis it can be safely asserted that Philby's 
scheme to solve the Palestine problem was absurd, un-
workable and above all humiliating and unfavourable 
to the Arabs, 
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PHAPTFR ~ III 
£!iItBYlS_PBRCEPTION_OF_ISlLAM 
Philby h s written about Islam both as a Chris-
tian British civil servant and as a Muslim after his 
conversion to Islam. Nctuially his writings on Islam are 
divided in to two kinds reflecting his two attitudes and 
hence deserve to be studied separately. However, in both 
phases of his life, Christian and Islamic, he wrote mostly 
aoout the VVahhabee creed. Further more it should be 
noted that throughout his career he did not produce even a 
single intellectual or academic work on Islamic thoughts, 
dogm.-s and ethics. Infact he was the sort of Arabist whose 
special love was Arabian peninsula, its history and people, 
More particularly he was concerned with the Arabia of 
iDn Saud and his VVahhabee followers. 
1. The Islamic com^ 'Unity founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al 
Wahl-iab is called Wahahabiva. The followers of Ibn Abd al 
Wahhab call themselves Muwahhidun (unitarians), but 
are branded as Wahhabees, much in a derogatory sense, 
by their opponents. Hence it is a derogatory appellation, 
Piiilby, however, does not share the opponents' view but 
seems to have lii.tle respect for militant Wahhabees or 
'.Vahhabee fanticism. 
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Philby was a prolific writer and wrote extensively 
about.Arabian affairs. As a Christian he produced three 
important works, namely. The Heart of Arabia(two volumes), 
Arabia of the Wahhabis and Arabia, the last one being 
a history of the House of Saud and Wahhabee movement 
whereas the previous two works are his famous travelo-
gues which give an account of his experiences in Nejd 
which he explored in 1917 and 1918 while deputed as a 
British political agent to the Court of Ibn Saudo 
Before we proceed to discuss philby's preconver-
sion views on Islam and the Wahhabee creed it seems 
appropriate to make a few general observations about the 
nature of travel literatureo 
There have been adventurous people almost in 
every great nation who set out to travel in strange lands 
to collect information about the people inhabiting there 
and to narrate their experiences, horrible and pleasant, 
frigntening and amusing, to the audience back homeo 
1. Philby'5 other travelogues are the Empty Quarter. 
Shg"ba's Daughters. A Pilgrim in Arabia. Arabian 
Highlands and the Land of Midian, These were written 
after his conversion to Islam and understandably do 
not contain derogatory remarks about Islam and the 
Arabs. 
•» 92 -> 
In the days long past people used to form opinion about 
other people and nations mainly on the basis of the 
information collected through such travels and adventures. 
In the European continent, particularly in England 
travel literature has been a source of information 
about the people and countries across the globe for 
quite a lone time. The nineteenth century England 
witnessed a spate of travel literature about the orient, 
specially the Arab world, A traveller sees things 
his own way, interpretes them according to his own vision 
and attempts rarely or never to understand them as 
they really are or as they are understood by their 
upholders. The same has been the case with the nineteenth 
century English trevellers who, (with the exception 
of Wilfre d Scawen Blunt) travelled through and wrote 
about the l*/dddle East, more or less in a similar tone. 
'We the civilized and they (Arabs) the barbarians' was 
the recurrent theme of almost every travelogue. Most 
European travellers pretended to be a superior race 
and encountered Lhe Arabs as a hard without a shepherd 
or a family without a father whose everything from social 
and political structure to religion and civilization 
was so low and so barbaric that they needed the super 
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Europeans, the imperialists and colonialists, as their 
master and teacher in order to be civic and civilized. 
However, some travelogues produced in the first 
half of the twentieth century are slightly different 
from those written in the previous, century. Philby's 
are 
travelogues which have already been mentioned/ prominent 
in this category of travel literature. They do not 
contain a completely distorted picture of Arab realities, 
not are blindly hostile towards the Arab people, Infact 
Philby's description of his experiences in Arabia is 
objective in many respects. Moreover they can be regarded^ 
to a considerable extent, as a mirror of the age as 
they reflect thi cultural and socio-religious conditions 
of Arabia.The reason for his objectivity was his liberalism 
which he had acquired at Cambridge and which had eman-
cipated him from Christian bigotry. 
But it does not mean that his pre-conversion 
worksare completely free from erroneous notions about 
the Arabs and their religion. Despite a great deal of 
objectivity that he has maintained throughout his 
early works his outlook was still European, if not 
Christian. He seerr.s to be obsessed with a sense of 
belonging to a superior culture and civilization. 
- 84 -
This sense of belonging appears to have affected, here 
and there, his objectivity and prejudiced his judgements 
on many counts, ^ 'oreover this sense of belonging is 
aroused rather heightened to the maximum when threatened 
by a stranqe culture. Philby felt very intensely while 
travelling with the VVahhabee fanatics in Nejd that 
his British self and Christian identity wtis under a 
serious threat. 
'I had scarcely been conscious of 
the fatigue and worry which had 
accompanied my task in a land of 
fanatics who, by studied aversion 
and often by unconcealed expression 
of their hatred of the infidel in 
their midst, had made my life a lonely 
and depressing one.... 
The Wahhabee fanaticism helped nim regain his 
Christian identity which he had abandoned since his days 
at Cambridge. This resurrected Christianity made him 
oven speak like a Christian missionary : 
Irresistibly my thoughts carried me 
back over nineteen hundred year 
and more to just such a scene (a 
1. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis. London, 1928 P. 335. 
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Chrismas occasi^ .n which he celebrated 
among the desert Beduins) as this, when 
simple herding folk received the first 
tidings of an event destined to change 
the history of the world. Should one 
come this night with word that Isa ibn 
Miryam had returned to earth to gather the 
true believers to their God, the Ataiba 
shepherd folk would arise and follow 
him, believing and fearing not. 
Missionary zeal, whether in a Christian or in 
the followers of other faiths, is bound to make its 
upholder look down upon other religions. The resurr-
ected and revitalizea Christianity of Philby did the 
same. He took upon himself the task to raise objections 
about Islam, In doing so he appears to have little 
regard for fair justice, A balanced criticism is one 
that takes into account the arguments of the opponents 
which they might offer in defence of their position. 
On the contrary a lop-sided criticism, in reality, is 
a one sided speech, a monologue which does not bother 
about the views of others and thus involves the risk 
of verging onfolly. Such follies, specially about Islam 
1. Philby, The Heart of Arabia (vol 1) London,1922 p.181 
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and its various rituals are recurrent in Philby's 
early works : 
'It was d winter month that the Prophet, 
perhaps scarcely conscious of the 
inherent defects of the lunar calendar, 
selected for the first Ramdhan, it was 
moreover for Arabia that he legislated, 
little realizing perhaps that his creed 
would ever penetrate beyond its frontiers, 
but certainly ignorant that the span of 
day light differed at different latitudes. 
'He liegislated'clearly implies that Islam is not 
a divine religion. Philby apparently, and quite erro-
neously, sides with the Christian view that Muhammad 
(PBUH) was a pseudo prophet or an impostoro Equally 
erroneous is his assertion that the Prophet had no idea 
or foresight if his creed would ever cross the frontiers 
of Arabia after him. Scholars accuainted with the history 
of Islam know very well that long before the fall of 
the Roman and Persian empires the Prophet had prophesied 
of their ccncuest by the Islamic forces. Moreover if 
Philby had tried to understand the message of the Prophet 
1. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis. op.cit. P. I, 
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he would have realized fully that Islam was a univer-
salist and missionary religion, hence bound to transcend 
all frontiers, geographical, religious or cultural, 
Philby's remark that the Prophet was unaware 
of the 'inherent defects of the lunar calendar* smacks 
of typical Western prejudice to things oriental. The 
\^est scarcely blames itself for its failure to under-
stand the East. Rather, on the contrary, it condemns 
the East of being incomprehensible, Infact this mentality 
stems directly from a sense of superiority that the 
'//est has always been obsessed with. Philby, too, was 
a victim of this common Western malady. With litle 
application of mind he would have understood the benefits 
of the lunar calendar, specially in the case of fasting. 
For in this system, although the span of day light differs 
at different latituc'es, people 'of various places do not 
enjoy the blessing or suffer the hardship of seasons 
permanently. And above all religion is not a mathema-
tical calculation, it is a spiritnial experience and 
obligation. 
F-iostility knows no end; it can go to any extent-
Philby, after having once subjected the Prophet's 
personality to hostile criticism seems determined to 
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to spare no opportunity to downgrade the '^ 'essenger of 
Islam. He even tried to belittle him through indirect 
comments. In the following passage he has sterio-typed 
the Kinsmen of the Prophet whom he regarded as a primitive 
savage lot but in reality the target of his bitter 
criticism is the Prophet himself. 
'Arabs they doubtless are, but with 
little in common with the nomads of 
the desert, with their coarse features, 
their wild hair and bridgeless moses, 
they seemed to me to be of some 
primitive savage race descending 
unregenerated by rrdxture with 
higher types from the remotest antiquity, 
and these are the Quraish, the Kinsmen 
of the Prophet, 
A traveller is a privileged personalityo He des-
cribes what he - and in many cases only he - sees. 
One can not confirm his accounts which often amount to 
stereotypes, from other sources. The bad effect of 
such stereotypes on a lay readership can be easily 
imagined. The passage quoted above falls in the same 
category of stereotypes. 
Occasionally Philby seems to be highly impressed 
Dy the simplicity of Ibn Saud's creed and admires his 
1. Philby.The Heart of Arabia. (Vol. I), op, cit. P.203. 
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effective political and religious control over the 
people of Nejd. He is also all praise for Arab hospita-
lity, specially of Ibn Saud and his governers in 
various provinces. But in his conversations with them, 
time and again he mocks at their religious zeal and lack 
of knowledge. For instance he describes in a ridiculous 
manner that Ibn Saud did not know that the Americans were 
of English stock and spoke English. The king still 
thought that America was inhabited by Red Indians, 
Philby explained to the king about Red Indian and the 
term V^ est Indies and asked'if America was mentioned in 
the Quran. 'Yes', said Ahmad without hesitation, Ibn 
Saud came to his rescue when' Philby, hazarded the sugges-
tion that the New World had not been discovered in the 
time of Muhammad. 'But God Knows everything', he said, 
and the Quran is his word! Philby describes another inci-
dent in the same mocking tone : 
'Do you know, I asked, that you can 
reach America both by travelling 
westward and travelling eastward? 
ibn Saud was puzzled, but Ahmad 
reminded him of the 'Kurriyat' or 
'orbicularity' of the earth, though 
even that failed to satisfy him of 
2 
my complete sanity. 
i. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis. op. cit.P.2 
2. Ibid. 
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However, some time Philby seems to have engaged 
in serious conversations with Ibn Saud and other Arab 
notables on a variety of subjects. These conversations, 
to some extent, reflect the socio-religious conditions 
as prevalent in Ibn Saud's Arabia. 
In an Islaniic society free mixing of men and 
women is forbidden. However, the fair sex has full 
right to education and can freely engage in intellectual 
persuit. But in Wahhabee Arabia which pretended to be 
truely Islamic women were deprived of this fundamental 
right. Philby laments that they 'vere hidden away in 
senseless seclusion for the delight of Individuals, 
without education or training for the service of 
society. 
The conditi n of women according to Philby was 
pathetic on many other scores such as polygamy and 
divorce or the notorious Talac. He had opportunities 
to talk with Arab notables including Ibn Saud on these 
matters. Understandably he presents the arguments and 
counter-arguments in a way which appears to justify 
1. Ibid. P. 255. 
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his stand and put the Arabs on defensive. In such conver-
satioris which Philby has recorded here and there it 
can be easily noted that while he himself felt at 
liberty to pass a sweeping remark on Arab culture, 
he asked for evidence, if his Arab hosts ever ventured 
to make any generalized comment on English or European 
society. For instance when a certain Dr. Abdullah passed 
a aeneral remakr that ten per cent Englishmen were 
bigarr.ist Philby pressed him for evidence and forced to 
withdraw his charge. But when he himself charged that 
fornication and adultry were not rare in Nejd he did 
not feel the need for evidence, rather he did so on the 
petty pretext that he was told so and so. 
Philby's objection on polygamy and divorce reflect 
the common European outlook. However, it also appears 
from his accounts thtit his hosts were intellectually 
incompetent to satisfy him through reasonable arguments. 
For instance Dr. Abdullah, who has already been referred 
to, instead of explaining to Philby that in what 
circumstances and with what conditions the Islamic law 
allows polygamy tried to justify the said practice by 
the following argument : 
1. See,.Ibid p. 241. 
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'Europe's losses of men during the War 
would compel her to abandon her monogamous 
basis both in order to make good the 
actual deficiency in the populatioh and . 
also in fairness to the women otherwise 
deprived of all chance of marriage. 
Philby was not to be impressed by such hypothe-
tical arguments. Rather he felt encouraged to raise 
objections on other Islamic rites. Certain Wahhabee 
practices which they called truely Islamic also strength-
ened his belief that the Islamic law was incompatible 
with the modern age. Philby also records that how some 
Wahhabees used to make the Islamic law a langhing 
stock by their silly practices. For example he cites 
the case of a certain Ibn Maiman who 'had two wives 
well stricken in years' but had recently married a new 
sixteen or seventeen year old girl who'immediately 
asserted herself and presented her old husband with 
an ultimatum, as the result of which the two old wives 
were turned out of the house. Such is the great tragedy,' 
comments Philby, of the Islamic marriage laws - the 
stranding of derelict woman when they cease to serve 
1. Ibid. 
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. the main purpose for which men wed. Those who are child-
less when their turn comes are indeed worthy of pity'. 
As it appears Philby's understanding of the Islamic 
law on marriage is pitiably poor. But in his defence it 
can be said that he had not understood the Islamic law 
by reading some scholarly and competent treatise on the 
subject, but had known it from Wahhabee practices and t 
their observance of Islam. Indeed, if one can believe 
Philby's accounts, it appears that he was led to form 
a poor opinion about the Islamic law on marriage by 
no less an important Wahhabee than Ibn Saud himself. 
Once the latter argued with Philby in the following 
manner which can make anybody believe that the Islamic 
marriage law was lax and that of divorce was bound to 
cause troubles to divorced women ; 
'Why is it, asked Ibn Saud, 'that you 
English allow divorce to be so difficult? 
Among us when a wife no longer pleases 
we get rid of her by thrice repeating 
a simple word: Talliq, talliq, talliq, 
that is enough. Wallah, in my life-
time Ihave married five and seventy 
wives and, Inshallah, I have not. 
done with wiving yet, I am yet young 
and strong. And now with the great 
losses caused by the war assuredly 
the tln^ .e will come when the people of 
1 
Europe shall take more wives than one. 
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This travestical interpretation of the islamic law 
might be regarded as Ibn Saud's personal opinion but 
theeffeet it would have left on Philby's mind who hailed 
from a monogamous society can be easily imagined. 
Nevertheless he admiste that unlike many other Wahhabees 
Ibn Saud used to take care of his divorced wives : 
'Those of his wives, writes Philby, who establish a 
claim to special consideration by bearing him children, 
whether subsequently divorced or not, are provided by 
Ibn Saud with houses and establishments of their own, 
in which to bring up their royal children, and not as 
a general rule passed on to other husbands, as is the 
case with the divorced wives who have bore no children'. 
Other practices of Ibn Saud regarding marriage and 
divorce, in Philby's eyes, were equally disturbing. 
Usually Ibn Saud used to have three wives at a time and 
keep the 'fourth vacancy open to be filled temporarily 
by any girl to whom he may take afancy during his 
expeditions abroad'. Such a marriage would not lost long. 
Infact, the newly married women were sent back to their 
parents when he needed them no longer. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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Philby has extensively written on various Wahha-
bee rituals and practices, religious, social or cultural. 
But surprisingly nowhere he has ciscussed in detail the 
message and philosophy of Wahhabism as explained in the 
works of Muhammad Ibn Abdal Wahhab, the founder of the 
sect. Even in his Arabia which deals with the ups and downs 
of the Wahhabee movement he refers only in passing to th e 
teachings of Ibn Abdal Wahhab. For example he has quoted 
at length the statement made by the Wahhabee delegation 
deputed by Ibn Abd al V^ ahhab himself to ^eccan ecclesia-
stics in order to edify and explain the message of the 
Wahhabee movement. The statement is as follows ; 
The imputation of heresy to us (the 
Wahhabis) is a subterfuge and a 
calumny against us, while the 
destruction of domes is an act of 
piety and virtue, as in recorded 
by other writers and not challenged 
or questioned by the learned, and 
the learned Imams (i.e. the Imams 
of the four orthodox schools of 
sunni Islam) have given their 
verdict on recource to the saints 
for the purpose of intercession, 
and have condemned those who do 
so as guilty of infidelity, and 
no one maintains that it is right 
except ignorant infidels. 
1. Philby, Arabia. London, 1930. P. 24. 
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But such a short statement of fiith, as can be 
imagined, is not enough to sufficiently explain the 
message and philosophy of Wahhabism, For a fuller under-
standing of the creed Philby should have thoroughly 
studied the works of Ibn Abd al Wahhab. Certainly it 
would have helped him to present a more illuminating 
study of the VVahhabee creed and society as he saw them 
during his explorations in various parts of Nejd. 
Despite some misconceptions that Philby . harboured 
in his heart regarding Islam either because of his personal 
prejudice or because he was led to do so by some silly 
Wahhabee practices, it does appear that he had a keen 
desire to understand atleast the Wahhabee society and 
the creed they practised at the time he visited Nejd, 
Moreover he has narrated some of his experiences with a 
great deal of objectivity. Although there are certain 
errors in his accounts of the Wahhabee creed which shall 
be pointed out lateron, it is beyond all doubts that his 
objectivity would have made a good impact on the minds 
of English readers for whose benefit he had primarily 
written his works, 
Philby is at his best while narrating the Wahhabee 
mode of prayer and other related rites. Minute and vivid 
description and objectivity are soecially remarkable. 
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However, he has comniitted some mistakes as well which 
shall be discussed at their proper place. 
The first thing related with the prayer, as we 
know, is Adhan or the call to prayer. According to Philby 
the Wahhabee formula of Adhan is ^identical with that 
commonly used by other branches of the sunni church with 
the addition at the end of it of the favourite Wahhabi 
phrase 'Laihala ill'allah' . It should be noted that the 
last phrase which Philby mistook k as a Wahhabee addition 
is, infact, an essential part of the Adhan accepted by all 
Sunni Schools, 
After the Adhan, as Philby tells, the congregation 
assembles in a Masjid, the place of prostration, facing 
towards '*'^ cca. The prayer is led by'the Imam, generally 
chosen,,,, on account of his age, or standing, or of his 
2 
learning'. Philby again commits a mistake when he says 
that the second Adhan or Igamah ends at 'Qadaamat al Salat. 
(the service has begun) . Infact after this phrase which 
Philby declares the last one two more phrases implying 
God's greatness and his oneness are proclaimed by all 
1. Philby, The fteart of Arabia. (Vol.11) op, cit. P. 251 
2. Ibid. P. 252 
3. Ibid. 
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Sunni schools including the Wahhabee sect who follow 
the school of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. 
Philby has described at length that how the prayer 
is said. His description of the prayer is remarkably 
minute but does m contain many errors. For instance 
regarding the end of the Maghrib prayer he writes : 
The sunset prayer, which is almost 
identical with the 'Asha, is now gone 
through, and at its conclusion the 
Imam, first turning his head to the 
right and then to the left, repeats 
in each direction the formula:'salam 
'alaikum wa rahmatallah. There fdllows 
a slight pause and a general clearing 
of throats. 
In the like manner he writes that how the Ishj^  
prayer ends ; 
'The Imam, turning as before to right 
and left, pronounces the benediction 
as at the close of the Maghrib service 
Thereupon he turns round and faces 
the congregation, all siting, and there 
follows a confused murmur of voices 
repeating three formulae containing 
1. Ibid. 
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recitations of the attributes of God, 
each thirty three times, or ninety nine 
2 
times in all. 
From Philby's narrative one may get the impression, 
specially those who are not well-acquainted with the 
Islamic theology, that even throat clearing or whatever 
follows after the Salam that marks the end of the prayer 
are related with the prayer. It should also be noted that 
even the recitation of the attributes of God which has 
no doubt a religious significance and is done in conso-
nance withthe tradition of the Prophet is not an essential 
part of the prayer, 
Philby is right when he says that the Wahhabee mode 
of prayer is almost identital with that of other Sunni 
Muslims. But his following observation seems ridiculus 
and typifies a traveller's attitude who accepts things 
at their face value without realizing that one or two 
incidents that he has seen, may be, instead of being 
common, might have been simply the acts of concerned 
individuals ; 
But they (Wahhabees) differ most from 
others in the total absence of all empty 
formality both in their attitudes, which 
are left to individual predilections, and 
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in the matter of single-hearted conc-
entration on the proceedings, for I 
have seen them rise suddenly to their 
feet in the midst of a solemn prostration 
to chase an unruly camel and return to 
their prayer for all the world as if no 
interruption had occurred.. 
In another place philby writes that the 'late arsival 
of individual worshipers is considered immaterial, much 
diversity from the correct attitudes, even if it amounts 
, 2 
to inattention, is permitted, haste is tolerated. The 
way Philby describes all these in one breath may give 
the impression that devotion and concentration are not 
required in Islamic worships and prayers. 
However, Philby describes other aspects of the 
Wahhabee prayer with considerable insight and exactness, 
•When journeying, he writes, they are permitted from 
motives of convenience to telescope the five appointed 
times of prayer into three, but not thereby to shorten,,, 
the prayers themselves'. However, he does not elaborate 
whether the Wahhabees reduce the number of Rakat or not. 
1. Ibid. P. 253. 
2. Ibid. P. 179 
3. Ibid. 251. 
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a 
By Taqsir (shortening) he understands that/traveller 
can unite the midday and afternoon (Zuhr and Asr) prayers 
at a time roughly midway between the two or some time 
before the later (Asr) prayer. Likewise he can unite the 
Maahrib> and ,Xs^ \a^  the sunset and the evening prayers 
respectively, 'But the time for this is unalterably fixed 
at the moment when the sun sinks below the horizon or -
as some of the stricter sort insist - when the light 
definitely attributable to the sun itself is seen no more". 
As far the ddwn prayer (Fair) Philby says that it will be 
said at its usual hour both on a journey/ and otherwise, 
Philby observes that the Wahhabaes of the northern 
Nejd differed from those of southern region on certain 
matters. For instance Adhan is 'proclaimed in the south 
country immediately after sunset and before sunrise when 
the sky is bright with the actual light of the sun, 
whereas further north the morning call is made just 
before the first light of dawn and evening call when the 
last vestige of the sun's light has disappeared. The 
northern Wahhabees, according to Philby, regarded the 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. P, 178 
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practice of their southern brothers as a deviation or 
heresy. In their view strict time keeping in the matter 
of prayer is one of the most important and primary 
conditions. These Wahhabees became disgusted with their 
southern co-religionists on the question of Qadha(making 
good an amission to pray at the correct moment) as well. 
They held that Qadha is permissible only when it is 
caused by no fault of the individual concerned, Philby 
regards these suqabblings as the beginmings of'theological 
hair splitting among the simple Arabs of the desert'. 
Besides various aspects of the prayer Philby has 
described at length that how the Wahhabees observe the 
holy month of Ramadhan. As that of the prayer his narrative 
of the holy month is minute, objective and reflects his 
keen power of observation as well as insight into various 
Wahhabee practices. Remarkably Philby's narrative (of 
the holy month) is free from glaring errors. Moreover 
Philby is not merely concerned with matters, of theological 
import, rather he is keen to know that what the Wahhabees 
do or how they spend the holy month in order to achieve 
spritiiial perfection and success. Thus his narrative has 
become a mirror of the socio-religioius realities of the 
then N.ejd, 
1, Ibid. 
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According to Philby Ramadhan occupies a prominent 
place in the Wahhabee scheme of things, ^ t is as important 
as the Passover to the Jews or Lent to the Christians. 
A fastincf person, says Philby, must abstain from eating, 
drinking, smoking and from indulgence in sexual inter-
course. He further says that the Wahhabees are on a par 
with the Muslims of other sects regarding the above matters. 
However, they differ from others in the rigid observance 
of precepts, which their brethren profess but do not 
always follow. They 'differ again in eking out the weary 
hours of the long day in prayer, contemplation and the 
reading of the scriptures, for prayer is better than sleep', 
but above all they differ from their fellows in their 
manner of spending the short hours of the night 'Lailat 
ul Qadri Khairun min Kulli lailatin - the Night of Glory 
is better than all nights, for which reason the nights 
of the month of Ramdhan are more excellent than the nights 
of any other month of the year'. 
All days and nights of the holy month are important 
in the eyes of the Wahhabees, But the last ten days, 
specially the nights of the.odd dates are better than the 
others. For any of the five nights can be the Night of 
glory. Here philby found an opportunity to pass a derogatory 
1. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabees. op, cit, p,3. 
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comment on the Prophet. He thinks that the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) could not specify the exact date of the 
Night of Glory because he was unable to do it. Perhaps 
he wants to suggest that Muhammad (PBUH) was not a prothet 
in the class of Jesus or other true prophets. Otherwise 
he must have specified the date. Whatever reason, it shows 
Philby's disrespect or atleast a misconception about the 
Prophet, Infact if one reads carefully the sayings of 
the Prophet regarding the Night of Glory he would cShie 
to the conclusion that the purpose of leaving the date 
unspecified was to encourage the believers to worship the 
Almighty to the maximum in order to attain consummate 
spirituality. Perhaps the Wahhabees understood it. For 
the nen-specification or uncertainty of the date, according 
to Philby, meant more prayers and worship for them. Because 
the 'uncertainty (about the date of the Night of Glory) 
is rendered the more uncertain by the fact that the lunar 
months, depending for their beginning on the actual appea-
rance of the moon to human eyes, are i always liable to 
an error of one day, one way or the other, in respect of 
their component days. Thus the 2C)th may be the 21st or 
vice versa, and Wahhabi practice, to be on the safe side, 
ordains a special programme of rigorous religious exercise 
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for all the nights of the month from that of the 20th 
until the end. And thus it is that, should bi the Night 
of Glory manifest itself suddenly and .unawares, the 
Wahhabi congregation will be found ever ready - in the 
very act of prayer and adoration -7 to enter the portals 
of Paradise I 
It was not only the night which was spent in prayer 
and service. A considerable portion of the day was also 
devoted to religious exercise, Philby observed that besides 
regular prayers, comtemplation and extensive readings 
from the Holy Quran were special features of every 'Wahhabee 
day' during the whole month of Ramadhan, He cites the case 
of a certain Abd al Rahman who usually used to read the 
whole Quran as many as thirty times in as many days. Even 
Ibn Saud who had to attend to the affairs of the State, 
would find time to make four or five reading of the whole 
Quran. Philby regards these stupendous religious exercises 
of the Wahhabees as a real 'test of their fortitude and 
physical, as well as moral, capacity to endure'. Endurance, 
in Philby's view, is a great quality and the holy month 
gives it to those who observe it, Philby further siays that 
since the purpose of the great fast is spiritual edification 
1. Ibid. P. 4. 
2-. Ibid, P. 5. 
- 106 -
or purification of soul 'for admission to Paradise it is 
held by the Wahhabis that, to be fully effective and 
acceptable, it must be accompanied by prolonged periods 
of prayer interspersed with periods of reading from the 
Quyap and by a complete distraction from the affairs of 
the world and from all sorts of wickedness, 
Philby gives a full-length account of other rites 
related with Ramadhan such as suhur, Aftar. Trawih. and 
Qiyam etcetera. According to Philby the Wahhabees wake 
up long before the time prescribed for Suhur (pre-down 
meal), ^syally they say a private prayer (probably Tahilud). 
After this, that is, before the true dawn (Fajr al Sadiq) 
they eat and drink in accordance with the practice of the 
Prophet. They stop from eating and drinking when the Adhan 
for morning prayer is proclaimed from the various mosques. 
Soon after the Adhan follows the prayer. 
The prescribed time for breaking the fast is sunset 
Adhan. Most Wahhabees, according to Philby, break their 
fast at the first sound of the Adhan for the Maghrib 
prayer. However, there were others, who used to wait until 
2 
the end of the Adhan for breaking the fast. Philby also 
mentions the difference between the Shiite Muslims (who 
were known as Rafidhees in i Nejd) and the Wahhabees 
1, Ibid. 
2. See, Philby.The ^eart of Arabia. (Vol,II) op, cit, p. 250, 
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regarding the timing of the Adhan. He noticed that the 
Shiites proclaimed the Adhan only when the first star 
appeared on the horizon but the wahhabees did so immedia-
tely after the sunset or when the last vestige of the 
sun disappeared. 
Philby does not tell how the common people broke 
their fast. However, the regular practice with the Wahhabee 
monarch, Ibn Saud, as Philby tells us, was to'repair to 
the roof of the private apartments of the palace, where 
he would be joined by various members of the royai 
family. Thus * assembled they would await the first sound 
of the Adhan announcing sunset, each man holding a date 
between his forefinger and thumb while repeating the 
phrase Astaahfir' Allah' again and again in accordance 
with the practice and precepts of the Prophet*. Dates, 
water and sliced melons were the usuall items of the 
royal After which was followed by sunset prayer. 
After an interval of over an hour the evening prayer 
(Isha) is Said which is then 'followed by a further 
course of prayers known as Trawih or Special Supplications 
for the'salvation of the soul from the dangers surrounding 
it. In the last ten nights of the month Trawih, after 
1. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis. op. cit. P. 6 
2. Ibid p. 7. 
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a short interval, is followed by the Qiyam or the resu-
rrection prayer as Philby calls it. The Qiyam, according 
to Philby, marks the culmination of the holy month. This 
prayer is said through the whole night until the Suhur 
or predawn meal. The Qiyam, Philby ppines, was an 
exhausting service with terribly prolonged inclinations 
and prostrations. Keeping in view the human frailty each 
set of the Qiyam service was followed by a short interval 
in which the prayer sayers were provided refreshments such 
as coffee and tea within the mosque precinets. 
The long ordeal of Ramadhan, as Philby calls it, 
ends with Id al Fitr celebration. Id is a day of rejoic-
ing and fasting on this day is not permissible. However, 
after the Id day people are allowed to observe a set of 
six additional fast in accordance with the Sunnah of the 
Prophet, It is held, writes philby, 'that those whose 
fortitude is equal to this extra penance are practically 
assured of admission in to Paradise in due course'. 
Besides the prayers and the fast, Philby has des-
cribed some other aspects of the Wahhabee creed with 
1. Ibid. P. 14. 
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equal insight and fairness. For instance he tells about 
the Wahhabee attitude towards religious books and their 
practice to listen to readings from the traditional litera-
ture after every evening prayer. The passages selected 
for such readings are mostly from the Holy Quran which 
generally deal witi. the terments of the hell fire Philby 
further says that the Hanbali school which the Wahhabees 
fallow regards only two commentaries as authentic, Tafsir 
Ibn ^athir in twelve volumes and Al Baghawi which is in 
six volumes. The Wahhabee position on the^succession of 
persons whose exposition of the divine law is accepted 
is as follows;first the Prophet himself, secondly his 
companions, thirdly Al Tabi'in or the associates of the 
companions, 'and lastly Al Tabi'in (Tab'ee)al Tabi'in 
or the associates of the associates of the companions. 
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, whom the Wahhabees fallow,'was of the 
last category! 
Philby has also recorded Ibn Saud's exposition of 
the true faith which according to him (Ibn Saud) remained 
unchanged in the first three centuries of Islam. However, 
in the thousand years that followed, the faith, according 
1. Ibid. P. 46. 
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to the Wahhabee monarch, was polluted by a number of heresies. 
The Wahhabee creed stands to free the faith from the 
stranglehold of innovations and perversions such as 
visitation to the tombs of the' saints and supplication 
for their intercession with God for the sake of salvation 
or for the fulfilment of a wordly need. 
Until now Philby's attitude towards Islam as reflected 
in his early works which '. he wrote before embracing, 
Islam has been examined. In the pages to follow an attempt 
is made to discuss his perception of Islam as found in 
his post-conversion works, 
HIS CONVERSION TO ISLAM 
Philby embraced Islam in 1930. His conversion was 
a big news both in Arabia and abroad.Many Muslims including 
Ibn Saud welcomed him to the fold of Islam, However, there 
were others, including some of the King's high officials 
but most specially the extremist Wahhabees who had always 
resented his presence in Arabia and who raised doubts 
about his sincerity and continued to suspect that he was 
a spy of the British Government. As far the Christians 
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including his family members, they seem to have been 
greatly upset by his conversion, 
Philby was contemplating to embrace Islam since 
his resignation from the British Government in 1924, 
Many a time he felt like doing it. So expected many Arabs, 
For example once he told a certain Ibn Rawwat: You must 
consider me now a Najdi, for I will not leave this country. 
Inshallah, he replied piously, you will embrace the true 
faith'."^  But the time for his convertion came only in the 
summer of 1930 when he was invited by Ibn Saud to perform 
the necessary rites in order to become a Muslim, 
We have already noted that the Christendom had not 
welcomed Philby's conversion. His family was specially 
upset. After hearing the news of his conversion Dora, 
Philby's wife,wrote to the letter's mother. May : 
I've-had the most disturbing letter 
from Jack(Philby), So he has taken 
the step at last. It does not matter 
really, I suppose, I don't know quite 
what to think of it and on the whole 
2 
I am sorry. 
Old f r iends such as Percy Cox and Arnold Wilson 
were a lso disgusted and disapproved of h is s t e p . How-
ever, from a l l such accounts of resentment i t does appear 
1. Ib id . P. 58 . " , , . . . ' 
2. Monroe, E. Philby. of Arabia, op.cit, p. 169, 
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that both his family members and friends alike did not 
have any doubts about his sincerityo But Elizabeth Monroe, 
a biographer of Philby, has expressed the opinion that 
he was not a sincere convert to Islam. She had quoted 
extensively from Philby's unpublished diaries and 
other sources to prove her point. She thinks that Philby 
embraced Islam for two reasons: the first was the material 
one that he needed readier access to the King in order 
to do business; he longed, also to travel in the desert 
as of right, becoming a Muslim seemed to him the only 
way of accomplishing the exploit of his dreams ~ the 
crossing of the Rub al Khali. His second reason was rather 
less material. 
However, Monroe accepts that Philby was contemplating 
to embrace Islam for quite a long time. Quoting from his 
unpublished diaries she says that he divided his life 
into two phases. In the first phase he was a devout 
Christian, The second phase dates from his admission to 
Trinity college, Cambridge where he gradually became a 
socialist, anti-imperialist, even atheist. After his 
resignation from the British Government, he began to think 
1. Ibid. P. 163, 
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to open a new and last chapter:to enter the Islamic 
faith. Monroe wonders that how a man 'to whom the existence 
of God had been intellectually incredible since 1907' 
would all of a sudden enbrace islam, 'a religion that hung 
upon His oneness, as if God could be s4/itched on and off 
like a light 1 In her opinion philby embraced Islam not 
to satisfy some inner spiritual urge but for the sake 
of convenience. She supports her remark by quoting from 
an Englishman : 
'I saw him once alone.(wrote Hope Gill, 
incharge of the British Legation in 
the summer of 1930). He made no pretence 
what ever that his conversion was 
spiritual. He had been deliberating 
the step for four years, ever since 
the first hot moments of his rage against 
HMG's Arab p81icy. This had now cooled, 
and the process had left him without 
rancour, but his disassociation from 
British ideals remained and he felt 
increasingly cut off from things 
British and drawn to things Arabian. 
The main thrust of Monnroe's argument, as can be 
ascertained from the above discussion is that the factors 
1. Monroe, E. Philbv of Arbia. op, cit. P. 164, 
2. Ibid. P. 164-165. 
- 114 -
behind Philby's conversion were not spiritual. This 
is true. Even philby said so as we^shall see it later 
on. However, her comment that how an agnostic can 
suddenly change into a devout religious personality 
seems ridiculous. If it is possible for a man to give 
up religion in order to espous agnosticism, it should be 
equally possible for him to cast the devil aside and 
begin believing once again in the existence of God. After 
ail it is widely accepted that hearts change and often 
within no time. 
Fairness demands that we also take into account 
Philby's own explanations and reasons for his conversion 
which he offered on a number of occasions. At Ibn saud's 
request he wrote an article in Ummal Qura in which he 
declared thot 'Allah has opened my heart to the acceptance 
of Islam c^nd has guided me to accept this religion in the 
rooted belief and full conviction of my conscience'. But 
this is^  more or less, a declaration of faith only. It 
does not spell out his reasons for adoptin-g Islam, 
However, in his article,'Why I turned Wahhabi,he offered 
a convincing reason. He argued that as Cromwell's puritanisi 
was a source of England's strength so is Wahhabism in 
1. As quoted in Monroe. E, Philby of Arabia, 
op cit P. 168, 
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Arabia. The present Arabian puritan movement^ he argued 
cogently,'harbingers an epoch of future political greatness 
based on strong moral and spiritual foundations. Also I 
regard the Islamic ethical system as a real democratic 
frat ernity, and the general conduct of life, including 
marriage, divorce and the absence of unjust stigma of 
bastardy, resulting in a high standard of Arabian public 
morality, as definitely superior to the European ethical 
code based on Christianity I consider an open decla-
ration of my sympathy with Arabian religion and political 
ideals as the best methods of assisting the development 
of Arabian greatness', 
Philby had to explain the reasons for his drastic 
step to his friends as well. In a letter to Donald Robertson 
with whom he was always frank, he offered the most convincing 
reason, 'My future', he wrote, is irrevocably bound up with 
2 
Arabia and Ibn Saud,' He further explained that he might 
have been accused of acting out of anger if he would have 
embraced Islam five or six years ago when he resigned from 
1. Philby, Why I turned Wahhabi', Egyptian Gazette. September 
26th , 1930. 
2. As quoted in Monroe, E. Philby of Arabia, op.cit, p,170. 
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the British Government. But "now no such imputation or 
allegation he hoped can be laid against him. Moreover 
after citing his frustrations in his native Britain and 
his welcome by Ibn Saud in Arabia he writes : 
Anyway the deed is finally and 
irrevocably done, and I shall die 
in perfect equanimity in the Muslim 
faith for which (specially on its ethical 
side) I have a very real admiration. 
Apparently he appears to have been impressed by the 
ethical side of Islam , It does give credence to Elzabeth 
Monroe's charge that he did not embrace Islam because of 
some spiritual crisis that he was confronted with in his 
pre^ -Muslim life but for reasons purely ethical and material, 
However, whatever, may have been the reasons behind his 
conversion, material or otherwise, once he accepted the 
faith of Islam he stood by it till the end of his life. 
Moreover, his conversion, quite understandably, brought 
a change in his perception of Islam and the Arabs. He 
now identified himself with the Arabs, Shared their 
hopes and aspirations and regarded their achievements and 
failures as his own, 
1. Ibid. 
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HIS POST CONVERSION WORKS 
Philby's post conversion career is very productive. 
He wrote on a variety of subjects including Islam.An 
indepth study of his post conversion works reveals the 
fact that he had changed his attitude towards Wahhabee 
fanaticism,Even now he did not like militancy and preached 
rationalism and tolerance specially in matters religious. 
It is also possible that instead of calling it a changed 
attitude, one may regard it as a deliberate indifference 
on his part. For he had now converted to Islam and associated 
with the Wahhabees, hence it would have been awkward for 
him to criticise their faith. Whatever be the reason, a 
perceptible change of attitude is there. He no longer seems 
interested in criticising or mocking at the Wahhabees, 
whether it is their irrational hatred of foreigners 
(xenophobia), their literal interpretation of the faith 
or their ignorance of the world outside Arabia, Instead 
we find him admiring the simple faith and life-style of 
Ibn Saud and his Wahhabee subjects : 
•I hope, however, that I have been able 
to say and show you enough to stimulate 
your interest in a land which to some of 
you may seem somewhat forbidding, though 
some few atleast will probably agree with 
my view that there is a good deal to be 
said for a country and people who still 
preserve something of the virtue and 
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simplicity of an old world which 
has passed away from us almost 
unawares into the general chaos of 
modern civilization. That Arabia has 
a great future before it I have no doubt 
whatever. 
It has been noted in the discussion of Philby's 
pre-conversion works that he had serious objections 
on some Islamic practices such as divorce and polygamy. 
It is surprising that after embracing Islam he did 
not renounce publicly these objections. But we have 
sufficient evidence to prove that he had no longer 
any objection etleast regarding the practice of polygamy. 
For he utilized his iight to have a second wife by 
marrying a Muslim woman besides his christian wife whom 
he never divorced, 
Philby, however, wrote rarely on spiritual aspect 
of Islam. Indeed he seems little concerned with things 
spititual. Even in his book A Pilgrim in Arabia which 
gives an account of his performing the holy pilgrimage 
along with ibn saud, he only talks of the spiritual 
1. Philby, 'Mecca and Madina', R.C.A.S.Journal Vol.XX. 
1933, P. 517. 
- 119 -
experiences of others and does not tell us if he himself 
underwent any such experienceo For instance he a saw 
people busy in extra religious exercises, weeping out of 
the fear of God and asking His forgiveness. Moreover 
once he had a chance to spend a night in Ibn Saud's camp. 
He soon slept. But when he woke up seemingly in the middle 
of the night 'he saw that the King was a few paces off 
engrossed in his religious reading', Infact ^bn Saud 
was busy in extra religious service for the attainment 
of spiritual perfection. But these scejr^ es of spirituality 
and religiosity do not seem to have aroused any such feeling 
in him. He seems content with performing only the prescribed 
rituals of the holy pilgrimage. 
Visiting Medina or going there to see the Green 
Dome of the Proohet is not a part of the holy pilgrimage. 
But a visit to the sacred land is a dream that every 
Muslim harbours in his heart. This is the reason that 
most Muslims, after having performed the holy pilgrimage 
pay a visit to the sacred city of Medina and feel privileged 
to say prayers in the mosque of the Prophet. The scene is 
always very moving. For the pilgrim's memory is taken 
1. Philbv.A Pilgrim in Arabia, op, cit, pp, 32-33, 
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back to those glorious moments of history when the prophet 
was alive, fighting day and night against the prevalent 
ignorance and happily facing all sort of ordeals to save 
humanity from the Fire of Hell, He is reminded ofevery-
thing that the Prophet did or suffered for the salvation 
of mankind. Naturally hie. heart is moved. In sum he is 
enraptured with a great delight and owerpowered by an 
indescriabJfi spiritual and emotional experience. 
But Philby's accounts of his visiting the sacred 
city of Medina is devoid of any such characteristics, 
reflecting perhaps his general attitude towards things 
spiritual. Even a Christian traveller, Richard Burton's 
(who visited Mecca and Medina in disguise) accounts of 
the Holy Land are far more moving than Philby's, But 
Philby is able to give a symbolic meaning to some of the 
sacred objects such as the Green Dome which other European 
travellers wholly failed to do : 
'The five Minarets and Green Dome of Madina 
dominate the whole city in a most effective and 
charming manner,while the demolition of the 
many domed graves of the Baqi'a cemetery and 
other spots by the Wahhabis in 1925 has left 
the central feature of the city in a splendid 
isolation which, as I thought when I first saw 
the whole' scene from a far off, breathes the 
very spirit of Islam-the embodiment of great 
1, See for instance, Richard Burton, Personal Narrative 
of a Pilgrimage to el Medinah and ^^ c^ca. London, 1907 
(Vol. II.) P.161. 
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ideal of democratic equality dominated and 
governed by a great religion, whose founder 
lived during his life time and was buried 
after his death on the spot now covered 
by the Green Dome, 
But even more importantly he was able, after his 
conversion to Islam, to correct many a misconception 
regarding the faith of Islam, Infact he was in a good 
position to produce a travelogue which unlike those of 
Christina travellers, is unprejddiced and free from 
egregious mistakes. For he had exact knowledge of the 
rites and rituals related with the holy pilgrimage and 
other pillars of Islam, Naturally he used his accurate 
knowledge to serve his newly adopted faith. For instance 
while speaking to an English audience in london he cri-
ticised and • tried to correct the 'strange error so common 
among novelists and other fanciful writers, who so often 
represent the Muhammadans as turning daily in prayer 
towards the grave of their prophet at Mecca, As you all 
know, it is the House of God at Mecca they face at prayer 
time and not the prophet's grave at Madina, 
1. Philby, Mecca and Madina. op, cito P, 508, 
2. Ibid. 
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In the discussion of Philby's pre-conversion works 
it has been pointed out that because of his shallow study 
of the Islamic faith he committed many errors, specially 
in his description of the rituals related with jSalat, 
However, after embracing Islam, he made a thorough study 
of various Islamic rituals. As a result his narrative of 
the holy pilgrimage is free from errors. Indeed he has 
described the Haj rituals with amazing accuracy. Both 
in his pre and post conversion career Philby produced no 
compact treatise on Islamic thought and theology. Infact 
he was mainly concerned with the history and politics of 
Arabia, And since politics and religion have been inter-
woven in Islam throughout its history and were specially 
so during the reign of Ibn Saud about which Philby has 
written quite extensively, there came occasions when he 
had to explain some aspects of Islam. For instance when 
a suggestion was made in the (British) House of Commons 
to revive the institution of Caliphate by installing King 
Faruq of Egypt as the Caliph Sultan, he wrote that 'any 
aspirant to such preeminence who counts on enlisting 
European support for his condidature,' is doomed to failure 
He further explained that Islam 'does not regard the 
Prophet's mantle as a decoration to be conferred on some 
deserving prince, but as a standard to be carried, always 
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at t he post of danger, by a warrior willing and competent 
to lead a crescentade against the growing supremacy of 
Christendom, against the increasing encroachment on what ^  
remains of Islamic independence and freedom. ^ Abyssinian 
eunuch - and slaves have been caliphs before-capable, 
for instance, of ridding Palestine of its Jewish and British 
usurpers would have a better title to the caliphate in the 
eyes of Islam than any of its crowned heads of today, 
forced by their military weakaess to acquiesce mutely in a 
situation that Islam regards as a scandal, Islam expects 
its Caliphs to do their duty, and no prince, however great, 
can expect its acclamations until he has shown his worth 
in defence of its long neglected rightsl 
To sum up this chapter, it can be said that in the 
beginning of his academic career or in his pre-conversion 
works Philby's attitude towards Islam was both negative 
and positive. For instance he is negative towards the 
Prophet or when he describes his encounters with the 
•'fanatical'' Wahhabees, But he is positive as well as 
objective in his depiction of the Wahhabee creed and 
religious practices such as Saiat (prayer) and the' Tast 
of Ramadhan. And as far his post conversion works are 
1. Philby, ''Is Islam Ripe For A Caliph" ? Asia. 
(New York) November, 1938 P. 669 
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a 
concerned, one finds either/slightly changed perception 
or an attitude of indifference towards Islam, Although 
he was more conversant with things non~theological and 
political which have been dealt with elsewhere in this 
dissertation, his contribution to the understanding of 
the Wahhabee creed as practised during the reign of Ibn 
Sand is commendable,* indeed some thing to reckom with, 
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FAITH UNDER THE WEIGHT OF WEALTH 
Oil is an essential ingredient of modern world 
economy. It is the backbone of industrialization both 
in the West and in the East,and is the only international 
industry that concerns almost every country in the world. 
Hence, being an oilrich country means to be prominent 
in the comity of nations. Even countries, like Saudi 
Arabia, whose major portion of land is desert, arid and 
barren, have become politically and economically important 
for the sole reason of being richly endowed with oil 
resources. 
Like any oil rich country Saudi Arabia has been 
witnessing a revolution-economic, social and cultural-
since the discovery of oil in the mid 30s, Oil as a source 
of cultural and social change in Arabia makes an intere-
sting reading. One is confronted with the power of 
wealth corrupting the morals of a people who were adept 
in simplicity, austerity and religious observation. Wealth 
comes face to face with faith and shokingly the later 
is subdued at least for the time being, 
PHI LEY'S SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH IBN SAUD 
Philby was a friend, nay, a strong supporter of 
Ibn Saud, the founder and architect of modern Saudi 
Arabian Kingdom. He quarelled will his people, the British 
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and vehemently argued with friends and foes in and 
outside the British Government to promote the cause of 
Ibn Saud and his country. He took upon himself the 
responsibility and spared no opportunity that came his 
way to introduce Ibn Saud to the West, He became an 
adviser to Ibn Saud, unofficial and self appointed. 
Many of his advices went unheeded but some of them 
were taken seriously by the Saudi Government.One such 
advice that he gave to Ibn Saud led to the discovery 
of oil in his Kingdom. Philby, in fact, played a significant 
role in Arabian oil venture and from the very beginning 
keenly watched its development and the revolution it 
brought about in the lives of the Saudis, Being a regular 
attendant, even participant in the debates and proceedings 
of the Saudi Royal .Court he knew many a thing generally 
unknown to the outside world. Hence his views on the 
development of oil and its all embracing effect on Saudi 
society merit a serious and comprehensive study. 
PHILBY AND ARAMCO 
Owing mainly to his close and friendly relations 
with Ibn Saud and his ministers, Philby became an impo-
rtant asset to many Western concerns who were interested 
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in the exploitation of oil resources in Arabia. Added 
to it was his wide knowledge of Arabian geography and 
his notorious energy to work tirelessly on a given 
assignment. Among many companies which sought Philby's 
services to secure oil concession from the Saudi Govern-
ment one was the California Arabian Standard Oil Co, 
which in 1944 became Arabian American Oil,Co., commonly 
knowhas Aramco. Aramco considered Philby to be immensely 
useful to its interest in Arabia and, as a result, 
.secured his services to work for it, Philby proved in the 
subsequent period that /^ jramco had not pinned its faith 
in a wrong person. 
It was not easy for Aramco to get a concession 
from Ibn Saud to explore the prospetts and possibilities 
of oil in his Kingdom, for the later had problems with 
some Ikhwan leaders by the time it entered Arabian oil 
scene. Although he had been able to surpress the Ikhwan 
1. Philby, H. St, J.B,, Arabian Oil Ventures, Washington 
D.C,,1964, p. XI. 
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upsurge he knew full well that there were still elements 
particularly the militant Wahhabees who were averse to 
any such proposition as hiring a foreign company to 
exploit the mineral resources of the country. The Wahhabees, 
according to Philby, were virulent xenophobe. He charged 
even Ibn Saud with mild xenophobia. They were intolerant 
and opposed to the presence of foreigners in their country. 
It was the fear of such religious extremists which, 
according to Philby, prevented Ibn saud to give oil 
concession to Europeans or Americans widely held as in-^ 
fidels. Their presence in the holy land, according to the 
Wahhabees, was intolerable, even tliough their technical 
skill and financial assistance was badly needed to remedy 
the economic worries of.the country. 
1, Ikhwan (the Brothers) were, infact, the Arab tribesmen 
who joined a religious and military movement which had 
its headay in Arabian peninsula from 1912-30, under the 
capable leadership of Ibn Saud. They rose beyond 
tribal loyalties to form a cohesive community based 
on the principles of Islam, The main objective of the 
movement was to restore the pristine Islam and free it 
from the yoke of innovations and^ then, to preach 
and propagate it throughout the Islamic world,In the 
late 20S a powerful section of the movement rose in 
rebellion against Ibn S-aud for he, according to them, 
had deviated from the right path and was tempted to 
western ways and innovations. Ibn Saud successfully 
suppressed the rebellion in 1930. 
2. See Philby, Saudi Arabia. London,1953. P. 294. 
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IBN SAUDI'S FINANCIAL PROBLEM 
Faced with such a situation Ibn Saud looked forward 
to Islamic states to attract Muslim investors. His 
attempts, however, bore no fruits, ^ 'eanwhile the world 
was facing a global economic crisis caused by the Wall 
Street Crash. Saudi Arabia, too, was hit by the Great 
Depression, This put Ibn Saud in a tight corner.According 
to Philby 'the general atmosphere',at the Royal court,' 
at this time was one of gloom and depression. The world 
economic recession had set in with a ven§eance, and 
1. See Monroe,Elizabeth, Philby of Arabia. London, 1973 
P. 202. 
2. The Wall Street Crash refers to a disasterous economic 
event that occured in 1929. Infact, after the world War 
I America emerged as a great economic power and 
enjoyed a period of unprece"dented prosperity which 
is known as the Great Boom of the 20Sj, The Great Boom 
ended when in September 1929 the buying of shares at 
the stock exchange in Wall Street, New York began to 
slow down and people, fearing that prices may fall 
sharply further more, rushed to sell their shares. 
By October 24, the rush to sell reached panic prop-
ortions as share prices really fell too far. Hundreds 
of people who had bought their shares when prices were 
high were all 6f a sudden ruined. This disasterous event 
is remembered as the Wall street Crash. It is also 
known as the Great De pression for it indicatics an 
economic situation just reverse of the great Boom. 
The Great Depression told too much on American 
economy. People in financial difficulties rushed to 
draw out their savinos forcing hundreds of banks to 
close. Naturally people's buying capacity was also 
affected and as a result the demand for goods fell 
away. Many factories closed down leaving thousands 
of workers unemployed. The Great Boom had suddenly 
turned into Great Depression whose effect was world 
wide. Fience it came to be known as the World Economic 
Crisis as well. 
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Arabia was in for a lean time. The King and his ministers 
become increasingly glum' and began to devise ways and 
means to remedy the ailing economy. Attracting foreign 
investors to risk money in Arabia was the first on agenda. 
But the Government failed to achieve any success. Instead, 
Ibn Saud was 'obliged in 1931 to declare a moratorium on 
2 
the government's debts'. 
This, however, did not put an end to Ibn Saud's 
problems. Extremely worried and glum he used to frankly 
talk with Philby on matters financial. Philby, infact, had 
become important in those depressing years, specially due 
to his contants with some capitalists and big business houses 
in the West. Both the King and the Finance Minister, Abdullah 
Sulaiman, began to consult him to keep the country solvent 
and moving on economic front, Philby, himself was fully aware 
of the country's economic problems. In order to suggest a 
wayout one day he could muster enough courage to say that 
the king 'and his people were like folk sleeping over a vast 
buried treasure, but without the will or energy to rise and 
3 
search under their beds' . He explained his parable in terms 
of mineral resources of the country and urged the king to 
1. Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures, op. cit. P. 73. 
2. See, Monroe, E, Philby of Arabia, op. cit. P. 202. 
3. Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures, op. cit. P. 74 
See, Also. Philby. Arabian"Jubilee. (American Edition) 
New York, 1953, P. 176. 
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take measures to unravel them. Ibn Saud knew well that 
any such enterprise would require foreign assistance both 
financial and technological which at the moment he could 
expect to come only through oil concession given to some 
interested concern. In response to ^hilby's constant 
pursuation one day at Taif he blurted out : 
'Philby if any one would offer me a million 
pounds now (pounds were then gold of course) I would give 
him all the concession he wants' , 
IBN SAUD AND C,R, CRANE 
Responding to it, Philby, observed, that no one 
would risk such a huge amount of money until he is certain 
that there are mineral resources in the country. However, 
he urged the King to approach the American capitalist, 
Charles R. Crane for financial cooperation, Philby had 
reasons for singling out Crane, He was famous for his love 
of the East and wanted to end the East-West controversy. 
He was a philanthropist and used to spend his personal 
fortunes on trying to build bridges between Judaism, 
Christianity and IsJam. With such an idea in mind he 
singled out the Middle East, the birth place of the three 
religions, for his altruistic works. He had already visited 
Jidda in the winter of 1926-27 with a view to meeting Ibn 
1, Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures, op. cit. P. 74, 
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Saud. The later, then at Madina, however found it of 
no use to meet an unknown stranger. Thereafter Crane went 
to the Yaman where he helped the government to improve 
its harbours and roads, 
been 
Ibn Saud seemed not to have/much impressed by 
Philby's account of Crane, However, he authorized him to 
make contact with the reputed philanthropist and if possible 
to make arrangement for a meeting between the two, Philby 
immediately wrote to Crane who was then in Egypt, Crane 
accepted the King's invitation and arrived at Jidda in 
February, 1931, He discussed with Ibn Saud and his minis-
ters the problems facing his kingdom. But the meeting 
resulted in no financial achievement which was Ibn Saud's 
immediate goal. The only worth-while achievement from the 
King's point of view, was Crane's promise to provide the 
services of- a mining engineer to search for hidden resources 
in Arabia. As a result Karl S, Twitchell who had worked 
for Crane in Abyssinia and in the Yaman, arrived at Jidda 
in April 1931, He inspected various parts of the Hijaz, 
His surveys, however, brought no gladtiding and gave little 
promise of worthwhile exploitation for oil or water. He 
could discover only one workable ancient gold mine for 
1. Ib id , pp. 74-75 
See Also, Philby, Arabian J u b i l e e , op, c i t , p , 177, 
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which he later got a small concession. Meanwhile, oil 
was discovered in considerable commercial quantity in 
Bahrain. This led Twitchell to think on the line that 
there might be oil on the nearby Saudi mainland.With 
this idea in mind he went to America and made contacts with 
various companies - Texas, Gulf, the part-American Iraq 
Petroleum Company, the Standard Oil Company of California -
2 
urging them to risk some capital in Arabia. The last one 
seemed to be more interested, heeded to TwitchelJspersuation 
and on his suggestion secured Philby's services to play 
3 
the role of its intermediary with Ibn Saud, 
ARAMCO'S BID FOR OIL CONCESSION 
Philby agreed to work for the above mentioned 
company. But he made it clear to his American friends that 
while he will take care of their interest, he will at no 
cost compromise with the interests of the Saudi Government. 
This was what precisely the King, too, expected from him, 
' he (Ibn Saud) took me aside one day, and 
expressed his conviction that I would give priority to 
1. See, Monroe, E, -Philby of Arabia, op, cit. P, 203. 
2. See, Twitchell, Karl, Saudi Arabia. (Third Edition), 
Princeton, 1958, pp. 139-150, 
3. See, Monroe, E,, Philby of Arabia, op, cit, P, 203, 
- 134 
the interests of the government. I assured,,.(him) that 
I would do just that ' 
Philby knew well the interests of Ibn Saud, His 
government was in dire need of money and he wanted to 
squeeze as much of it as possible from the Americans. 
However, his demand for i 100,CX)0 as loan was too large 
an amount for the Americans to entertain. Knowing the 
Americans' hesitation the King agreed to reduce his 
demand to ^50,000 plus an anual rent of 5,000 in gold 
and a royalty of AS per ton on production in case oil is 
discovered in commercial quantity to grant a concession 
for the exploitation of oil in the whole of the Eastern^ 
province of his Kingdom, While philby advised the King 
to stick out for these conditions, he worked hard to con-
vince the Americans to accept them. His labour bore 
fruits and on May 29, 1933 an agreement was signed for 
2 
the s a t i s f a c t i o n of both the p a r t i e s . 
As i s evident from the above account Ph i lby ' s 
r o l e in Arabian o i l venture was v i t a l . By nego t i a t ing a 
successful agreement between tiie Saudi Government and 
the American company, Aramco, he had contr ibuted h i s share 
to the prosper i ty of Arabia, As for the explorat ion or 
exp lo i t a t ion of o i l he had no c a p a b i l i t y or s k i l l t o 
play a r o l e . In technological mat ters he was simply 
1. Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures, op. c i t . p . 81 
2 . See f o r d e t a i l s , philby, -^rubian Oil Ventures, op. c i t . 
pp. 116-129. 
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a layman. But in one way or indirectly he contributed to 
the practical exploitation of oil. His books and travel 
accounts proved immensely useful to Aramod's field workers. 
'Years later,• remarks Fred. A. Davies in his foreword 
to Philby's >-^ rabian oil ventures. 'Aramco geologists in 
their search for oil made daily use of Philby's early books 
and of his account of his crossing the great sand desert, 
the ^mpty Quarter (constable 1933), <-^ur American technicians 
never ceased being amazed at the boundless energy and keen 
po.vers of observation revealed in these works'. 
Philbyk formal connnecticn with Aramco ended in the 
middle of 1940, but fee keenly watched with sympathy and 
admiration both its difficulties and its triumphs, ^ e was 
sympathetic to Aramco, for in the beginning of its venture 
it encountered many frustrations, he was jubilant and full 
of admiration,for not only that it became a leading oil 
prioducing company in the subsequent period but also a 
'Philanthropic' institution of impressive proportion. 
According to Philby it rendered great services to Saudi 
Arabia, . specially in its programmes and projects on education 
health, housing, water supply, agriculture, industry, 
commerce, harbour development, transport, railway construc-
2 
tion and the like. 
1. Ibid. P. X. 
2. Ibid. P. 133. 
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PHILBY'S WARNING 
There were many, Philby included, who held that 
Arabia's newly found prSsperity may prove a snare and 
delusion as it has been else where. For money breeds 
evils, extravagance and corruption. It spoils people's 
morals, Philby was fully aware of the corrupting power 
of money. Hence he had a word of warning for the Saudis, 
He advised them to accept the new bounty from Providence 
with humility and with a determination, not to fall a 
prey to the evils associated with it. He reminded them 
to look back to the lean years of the past when their 
ancestors had to struggle hard to earn their livelihood. 
Their days were fraught with poverty and hardship. But 
they never swerved from their high ideals. They were 
virtuous people. They stood to serve their God with a 
single minded devotion which was both touching and bea-
utiful. The present day oil-riches, Philby held, were, in 
fact, a reward for their virtue. He, therefore, admonished 
the new generation to stick to their high Ideals and to 
follow their example in full earnest, 
HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AND CRITICISM 
But the new fangled denizens of Arabia disgusted 
him. They'did not learn a lesson from their glorious past. 
1. See, Philby, Arabian Jubilee, op. cit, p,182. 
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Instead tuey fell an easy prey to cupidity and materi-
alistic charm of the world. It became increasingly diffi-
cult for them to stick to the high ideals of their 
forefathers. In sum, they collapsed miserably under the 
weight of wealth. 
As money began to spoil the saudis, Philby began 
to grouse and growl. He might have prefered, like other 
Europeans and Americans, to let things as they were 
and to continue with his business activities which were 
going on very well. But he was not that sort of man. 
He chose to wage a 'crusade' aqainst the prevalent laxity 
ostentatious indulgence, bribery and corruption in high 
places. 
Philby's critical attitude towards the Saudis 
developed in stages. It was in the mid 30s when he began 
to complain of royal vagaries. He was .specially critical 
of Ibn Saud's administrative incompetence in financial 
matters. Ibn Saud was excellent in war.- and politics. But 
he knew nothing or little about financial and economic 
problems of the modern age. This immensely disappointed 
Philby. But he was still all praise for the King and 
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sought opportunities to pay clowing tributes to him. 
In public he was still painting bright picture of Saudi 
affairs but in private he was less enthusiastic. He wrote 
to Dora, his wife, in 1934 : 
'Things at present are in frightful muddle 
and everyone seems to be robbing the King 
and the government just as fast as they 
can and the King is helping them splendi-
dly He can not bear to be argued with 
and he always smothers anything any o'ne else 
may have to say in a torrent of words. 
This situation according to Philby's slcindard 
was intolerable. The Saudi Government had bought 1,450 
cars from Sharqieh, Philby's business company, and owned 
it alone f120,000. Thus Philby's business was completely 
in a bad shape and it was more than enough to excite his 
temper. This was of course one of the factors which aroused 
Philby's anger against the Saudis, 
But what irritated Philby the most was the misuse 
of oil riches. He found that the King and his advisers were 
not interested in making plans for public welfare. Instead 
a band of sychophants was robbing the King's treasury, right 
1. As quoted in Monroe,E, Philby of Arabia op. cit. P, 212. 
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and left, 'Great personal fortunes, writes Philby, were 
amassed by n-.any of the later (Officials) with astonishing 
rapidity, and transferred abroad for safe investment in 
real property or securities.Within the country, too, 
vast sums were spent in building palaces, mansions, hotels 
and blocks of flat on private account, especially by 
princes of the royal family and their henchmen*. 
It were, infact, the princes who were most affected 
by the new prosperity. Their way of living, .specially 
their addition to glitter and Juxury was remarkably an 
anti-thesis of ^bn Saud's own simplicity and austerity. 
Princes aside, even the common Arabs had taken to lazy 
ways ; 
"/Vhereas in the old days a man would 
walk fifteen miles to spare his camel, 
now-a-days he uses his car for every 
2 
small errand to the bazaar. 
The pilgrimage, too, had undergone a drastic change, 
In a letter to Dora he wrote. 
t > 
1. Philby. The Scandal of i\rabia. The Sunday Times, London, 
October, 23rd, 1955. 
2. As q,uotjBd in. Monroe,E. Philby of Arabia op, cit, 
p. 243. 
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'The cars and trucks must have been 
at least six abreast and hundreds deep... 
moving inches at time. Not only were 
there cars and trucks going in the 
right direction full of pilgrims, but 
also cars and trucks mostly empty 
trying .to go in the opposite direction. 
But Philby was to blame himself if the new look 
of /\rabian society dismayed him. For it was he who had 
iir.posed modernity on the country. This is why his 
criticism seemed absolutely ridiculous to his Saudi 
critics who were numerous both in and outside the 
Government, They were quick to condemn him for chiding 
the innovations he himself had introduced to the 
Arabian Kingdom. 
It were, however, Philby's two books, Arabian Jubilee 
and Saudi /urcbia (published in 1952 and 1955 respectively) 
in which he w< s more straightforward and boldly criti-
cised the royal vagaries. He not only exposed the rampant 
corruption but also explained the causes which led to 
such a sorry st.-te of affairs. Although his charge sheet 
1. Loc, cit. 
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against the Saudi Government can not be taken as gospel-
truth it is, however, difficult to doubt his sincerity. 
He knew full well that any criticism of the Saudi Govern-
ment will win him more enemies than friends and that 
it might hamper his business interest in the realm. But 
he was fired by an intense passion for the Saudis and 
wanted, with a reformer's zeal, to warn them at all cost 
of the dangers they were heading to. 
Philby's criticism seems to be mainly centred around 
moral decadence and financial misappropriation. Money is 
tr enjoy, but the moment it causes moral degradation it 
becomes dangerous and abominable. He is ready to give 
concessiv)n to the new generation which has not experienced 
the labours and perils of the old days when Saudi Arabia 
was merely a poor desert country to adopt the easier ways 
and enjoy the new prosperity on a princely scale. But 
he is bitter when he finds people so much indulgent in 
luxuries as to have no respect for 'reason, relgion and 
morality'. 
1, Even king Saud who in 1955 banished philby from Saudi 
Arabia for his Criticimr of the Kingdom never 
questioned his sincerity. Once, during a conversation 
with G. Clinton Pelham, the British ftubassador, he 
remarked. 'Oh, yes, of course.,, but I am sure that all 
he writes is inspired with the very best of intentions 
towards us. Philby.Forty years in the Wilderness. 
London, 1957, P. 10. 
2. Philby, Saudi Arabia, op.cit. P. XII. 
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/^ORAL DEGRADATION 
What was wrong with the morals of the new Saudi 
qeneration that disgusted Philby so much. It was, infact, 
their addictio.n to western habits that they had learned, 
according to him, 'in the gutters of the Westo He 
particularly seems to have been shocked by the rapid 
change or social revolutuon brought about by oilvriches 
within a decade : 
•...the once forbidden charms of music were 
openly paraded on the palace square or blared 
in the face of a monarch,who sickened at the 
sound. The forbidden cinema reared its ogling 
screens in scores of princely palaces and 
wealthy mansions to flaunt the less respecable 
products of Hollywood before audiences which 
would have blushed or shuddered at the sight 
but ten or fifteen years ago. Liquour and 
drugs have penetrated, more or less discreetly, 
in to quarters,where, in the old days people 
had been slain at sight for the crime of smoking 
tobacco, which has become now a substantial 
source of state revenue. Even the seclusion 
of women has been tempered to the prevailing 
breeze of modernism, and the motor cars provide 
facilities for visits to some beach or desert 
pleasaunce, where, they dance or frolic to the 
tunes of gramophone (another prohibited article) 
1. Philby, Forty years in the Wilderness, op, cito p,6. 
Also see Philby,* Riyadh: Ancient and Modern', Middle 
East Journal, Washington. Vol, XIII, 1959, No, 2. 
PP. 129-141o 
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in the latest summer frocks from Paris, 
or dine alFaresco in strapless bodices. 
According to European standard,as Philby points 
out, there was nothing particularly wrong with the new 
looi of things exc&pt that it would have horrified the 
doughiy warriors to whom, after all, the Saudi Arabian 
State owes its very existence. In sum what was held as 
deadly sin by the Wahhateie Code in not a very distant 
past had become now a part of modern Saudi culture. 
Philby is not against change^ if is for good. But 
the change for the sake of change or for the worst can not 
be appreciated. Change, whether right or wrong, involves 
abandonment of old values, even precious ones. And this is 
what precisely happened in Arabia. The Arabs readily 
abandoned their ancient heritage, spiritual and intellectual, 
for the sake of a new but farcical culture based on western 
models and ideals. They mistook new changes such as the 
development of an industrial proletariate, the growth of 
an urban population, construction of huge buildings and 
the realization of public works such as electricity, water 
supply, air-conditioning, roads, railways and the like as 
1. Phibly, Saudi Arabia, op. cit, P. XIII. 
2, Phibly, Forty Years in the Wilderness, op. cit. P. 7. 
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the hauimark of progress and prosperity. But what really 
makes a nation great was lun-known to them. It is not 
physical well being but 'things of the spirit and the 
mind' which raise a people to the status of greatness. 
The /orabs of the days of yore were great, not because 
they were materially well off but because they made 
invaluable contributions to human knowledge and civilization : 
''The Arabs,'' Philby admonished,'' should never 
allow themselves to forget that infact they 
have never been so great as when in ancient 
times they laboured to produce the so-called 
Roman alphabet of humanity, and the monothe-
istic creed which has conquered most of the 
world'i^. 
Ibn Saud perhaps never retlized the extend of 
religious back sliding which had sv^ ept over his people so 
rapidly. He was, however, fully aware of the moral degra-
dation of his sons. In the last days of his reign he 
admitted bitterly xhat he should alone be held responsible 
for the decline in morals and manners of his sons and the 
people , He used to frequently quote the Quranic verse. 
1. Philby, Saudi Arabia, op. cit. P. 344. " 
2. Ibid, 
1, Ibid. P. 351„ 
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'Verily your possessions and your children are your 
enemies' . It was intolerable for him 'to see his gold 
2 
transmuted in to baser metal'. Often he implored his 
prelates with passionate eloquence and 'with tears in 
his eyes and a tremor on his lips, to do their duty by 
3 
his people and save them from damnation'. It is true that 
he himself never swerved from the high ideals of austerity 
and religiosity, and that his faith remained unshaken by 
the wonders and horrors of modern science. But history, 
according to Philby, 'will not acquit him of prime respon-
sibility for the decline in manners and morals from the 
high standards prescribed rnd enforced during the first 
4 
four decades of his reign', 
FINANCIAL AaS/llANAGEMENT 
During the reign of Saud who succeeded Ibn Saud 
after the latter's death, moral decadence and illegal 
activities of the upper class instead of being checked, 
even began to *be condoned by the State, 'The Common 
thief still forfeits his hand, the common adulterer his 
1. Ibid. p. 297. 
2. Ibid, p, XIV. 
3. loc , cit. 
4. loc, cit. 
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heed; but the higher spheres of society, where speculation 
and vice are practised on an impressive scale, live their 
lives in their own way with complete immunity from censure 
or sanctions. In a recent case, indeed, a respectable 
member of the 'Virtue Committee' wcs consigned to orison 
for daring to criticise the laxity of the regime'. 
Besides his discontent with moral degeneration 
Philby was dismayed at wide spread corruption in high 
places. He was specially disappointed by the mismanagement 
of financial affairs. He was, however, not blind to several 
development programmes which were undertaken by the 
Government for the welfare of the common people. But 
even the most ardent admirer of Saudi Kingdom would agree 
that there had been gross extravagance or that money had 
not always been used wisely either because of inexperience 
or due to some other drawback. 
As a man wellacquinted with the intricacies of 
modern system of finance and fully aware of the Saudi 
financial system Philby was wellplaced to probe the 
causes of Ibn Saud's failure in areas of administration 
and financial appropriation. In his view the major fault 
was with the very system of government current in Saudi 
1. Philby, The Scandal of Arabia, op, cit. 
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Arabia at the tiii'e^  namely, the King, infact, is the government 
or the government is the King. It is a system in which an 
absolute monarch alone enjoys the whole and sole power. 
Although over-centralized this system was not too bad, 
.specially in the early days of Ibn Saud's reign v;hen he had 
not too many problems to deal with. In those days his kingdom 
included the Najd cmd al-Hasa only and he had primarily to 
deal vvj th his Bedouin subjects and the desert politics. In the 
given circumstances his patriarcal and over-centralized system 
worked well. But with the occupation of the Hijaz not only his 
kingdom expanded his problems, tooi increased. He was now an 
international figure and had to deal with puzzling problems 
of a strange world he had not confronted, hiterto, . In the 
changing circumsuanccs he needed a new system suitable to 
cope with the new kind of problems. But unfortunately he 
continued v/ith the old one, the partiarchal system, which 
1, In an article : 'Arabia in Retrospect' Phibly gives an 
account of Ibn Saud's daily governmental work, the way he 
used to work and the general atmosphere at his court; 'In 
his public assemblies open to all men three times every day 
without discrimination, one could sense an intellectual gap 
between the presiding genius, seated in great arm chair in a 
corner of his vast a.udience chamber, and the rank and file 
of his staff and visitors, grouped round the four walls of 
the hall or sitting on the floor, waiting on the words of the 
master with no need to trouble their brains with other than 
thoughts of their personal concerns. It was otherwise with 
him. There were verbal and written petitions to be received 
and dealt v/ith on the spot,* there were decisions to be made 
and hedisposed of all his business with an easy fluency, 
which argued not only deep knowledge of human nature but also 
genuine concern for the welfare of his people. '(Middle East 
Forum, Vol. XXXIII, 1958 pp. 14-15). According to Ibn Saud 
a ruler is the servant of his people. Ibn Saud, infact, 
borrowed the idea from one of the sayings of the Prophet (PBUH). 
And what a great ruler-servent he was. Even the smallest matters 
such es 'the arrival of a guest, the break down of a motor car, 
o niinor illness in the family, and other apparently trivial 
incidents would claim his personal attention side by side with 
State problems of the highest importance'. (Philby, Arabian Jubilee, 
op. cit. PP. 244-94^^- ' "• • '' * 
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naturally failed to provide an effective governmental 
machinery, hence chaos and disorder on every front. 
It was the economic front where the Government's 
failure was too patent and invited criticism from foes and 
friends alikeo While most people were content with grumbl-
ings and whispher Philby expressed his discontent openly 
and unambiguously. He was straigth forward and had courage 
to call a spade a spade. However, he was not cynical or 
hellbent to condemn the Saudis for their administrative 
incompetence. He takes note of the circumstances which 
might have upset any people or any administration, Ibn 
Saud's administration, according to him, was relatively 
primitive and ill-equipped to cope with the sudden 
onset of fabulous wealth poured upon it by the bountiful 
Providence. Well up to 1926 or before the conquest of the 
Hijaz (december 1925) the total revenue of Ibn Saud's 
Arabia (Najd and al Hasa) was barelyi100,000 a year which 
posed no unmanagable problem to his administrationo But 
when he occupied the Hijaz and ..specially after the 
discovery of oil in his realm the revenue of the Government 
increased tremendously. So much so that in 1949 it rose 
to 30,000,000 pounds a year. It was virtually a flood of 
wealth. There should have been a wise administrator to 
1, See for details, Philby, The Golden Jubilee in Saudi 
Arabia, Journal of the Central Asian Society, Vol, XXXIII, 
1950 P. 112. See also, Philby, Arabian Jubilee.op, cit. 
p. 182. 
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make best use of this fabulous wealth. But unfortunately 
Ibn Saud had no knowledge of modern economy and finance. 
The intricacies of audit, accountancy, reserve funds and 
the like were beyond his comprehension. The system upon 
which he had been dependent hitherto, and which can best 
be described as the will and wisdom of an absolute monarch, 
crashed under the weight of the fabulous wealth. The 
resultant chaotic situation of the country's finance should 
be anybody's guess. In the words of Philby : 
The Finance Department,., was soon reduced to the 
stctus of an egency for producing funds for this 
scheme or that, without regard to the merits of the 
scheme themselves or to the genuine availability 
of the money required for them. Every departmental 
chief was, as it were, a law ^nto himself, subject to 
the King's overriding pleasure and there was no 
government to coordinate the work or requirements 
of the departmenis except the king himself, who was 
obviously over-loaded with other preoccupations, ahd 
certainly not in a position to assess the capacity 
of the treasury to meet all the demands made on its 
resources.' 
In such circumstances, as can be imagined, the 
Finance Department emerged as dominant and controling 
1. Philby, Saudi Arabia, op, cit, pp. 342-343, 
- 150 -
autnority to whose will end widsom other departments of 
the state were subjected, at least practically. In other 
words every organ of the Government, except the Royalty, 
was dependent on the Finance Department for its functions. 
As the King was absolute and his requirements supreme it 
became the prime responsibility of the Finance Department 
to provide funds to fulfil every demand of the Royalty. 
And the King's "demands were aplenty which always put an 
extra burden on the State's treasury. Next to Royalty in 
power and position was the Finance Department, It had 
absolute powers to appropriate funds, according to its 
own discretion, for other departments of the state. This 
inevitably led to mismanagement. For it had no idea of 
planned or controled expenditure. It was always more than 
ready to start a' scheme that interested it without consi-
dering the fact whether the funds available were sufficient 
to initiate such schemes or not. As can be imagined in 
these circumstances, the Saudi Government, despite the huge 
royalty of oil production, remained throughout the reign 
of Ibn Saud without any reserve fund whatsoever 'while 
carrying a public debt running in the many tens of millions 
2 
of pounds', 
1. /vrthur M. Young in his brilliant study, Saudi Arabia : 
The Making of Financial Giant. (New York"]| 1983) has 
expressed quite similar views. See p, 45. 
2, Philby, Saudi Arabia, op. cit. P. 343, 
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The reason far this sorry st^ .te of affairs, 
according to Philby, should be sought not only in the 
mismanagement of finance as elaborated above but also in 
the limitless extra vagance which swept over the country 
after the discovery of oil and which we have already 
discussedo Other factors which Philby avoids to mention 
were American business interests. In fact it will not be 
erroneous to hold Ajnerican experts working in Arabia 
equally responsible for the chaotic financial situation. 
Philby never thought on this line. Instead he criticised 
the Saudis as being ungrateful to the initiators (Americans) 
of their prosperity. Americans, in his opinion, were never 
well rewarded for their numerous 'altruistic' works in 
Arabia, It was, infact, a grossly fallacious stand that 
he held throughout his life. Only a fool can dare to deny 
the Arabian generosity tov^ a^rds the Americans, In point of 
fact it were Americans, many if not all, who, instead of 
helping the Saudis to make a better use of oil-money, 
began to exploit their administrative innocence. In their 
extenuation it can be said that they were not the master 
of the land, hence unable to shape its destiny. But this 
is not a convincing excuse. For they were always in a 
position to influence the Government's policy, financial 
1. See for details, Philby, 'The Scandal of Arabia*, 
op. cit. 
- 152 -
or political. As well-wishers of the Saudis, as Philby 
used to call them, they should have helped them to run 
the country's finance in consonance with the principles 
of modern economics and finance. But they did little of 
the sort. Instead it were more often they who presented , 
schemes after schemes to the Saudi Government for petty 
commercial gains. In fact they did little to stabilize 
the country's finance despite the fact that they had all 
the skill, knowledge and opportunity to do so, 
Philby's criticism went in vain in the sense that 
it brought about no worthwile reform in Arabia, Instead 
he won enemies who, after the death of Ibn Saud in 1953, 
grew strong enough to create problems for him. Throughout 
the long reign of Ibn Saud he had enjoyed freedom of speech 
and freely criticised or argued with him on several issues, 
both national and international. However, the new regime 
of Saud, Ibn Saud's son who succeeded him, was intolerant 
to any such activity. But Philby would not accept any 
restriction on his freedom to speak or to criticise the 
policies of the Government, He continued to do so until 
he was banished, though for a short while from the country. 
He was obviously shocked. But he took, the shock philoso-
phically. He equated himself with Ibn Taimiya and Muhammad 
2, An /American mission headed by Arthur N, Young came 
to Saudi Arabia in the early 1950s at the request of 
the later to modernize the financial system of the 
Kingdom, But tiiis did not stop the Eurpean and American 
businessmen from exploiting the Saudis, specially during 
the first half of King Saud's reign. 
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Ibn Abdul Vi/cihhab, the intellectual- founder or ideologue 
of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, who suffered imprisonment 
and banishment respectively for their vigorous preaching 
and criticism of the laxity and back-sliding of their 
contemporaries, 'And now the same sins were returning in 
full measure to a l<.,nd so recently purged of its deviations 
by the great King (ibn Saud) who had just passed from the 
scene. It was obvious,' he went on to say. 'that the new 
Jeremiah would have to be treated like the prophets 
preceding him, or his jeremiads taken seriously as a basis 
for reform. And nobody in Saudi /\rabia wanted reform of 
the strange and pleasant ways of the new worldj of which 
it only demanded its women and wine and music-and its 
money.' Besides, Philby seems to have been disgusted with 
'clmost complete secularization of what had been a theocratic 
.':tate, based and administered on the strictest principles 
of Islam, in whose sacred law, the Shar,' the very sover-
eignty of the realm is theocratically vested. Little, if 
anything, of that theory survives today, v/hen the cradle 
of Islam has been absorbed into the realm of the Saud, with 
the cn-iphasis on Caesar rather than on God' . 
1. Philby, Forty Years in the Wilderness, op. cit, pp. 7-8. 
1. Ibid. P. 10. 
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Philby wi.s certainly bitter while writing the 
above phrases. Corruption there was indeed in Arabia 
but not to the extent he wants us to. believe,' Likewise 
the bad effect of oil riches on Saudi morals was too 
pcuent to be denied. However, the State, unlike Phibly's 
assertion, was still religious. Caesar had nodoubt, come 
to occupy some promonence but God was still alive and 
far from being dead or relegated to a secondary place,-
The banishment seems to have had upset him beyond limits,He 
grew testy and pugnacious, wrote letters, articles and gave 
interviews to western journalists criticising the Saudi 
regime, specially its wasteful spending. But his articles 
and interviews did not go unchallenged. There followed 
a spate of criticism. The Arab media charged 'that he 
had accumulated a fabulous fortune, that he had abandoned 
Islam, th--t he hcd been paid a huge salary as adviser 
to Ibn Saud, or that he was a friend of the Jews'. 
These were, infact, baseless chargep,even vilifica-
tions and more in a nature of reaction© Philby was quick 
2 
to relute them, Hov^ever, every critic was not viciously 
inimical to him. Many friends and admirers too drew his 
1, Monroe, E, Philby of Arabia, op. cit. pp. 285-6, 
2. Philby refuted the charges levelled against him by 
a section of the Arab media in his book. Forty 
Years in the IVilderness (See,pp. 226-43) 
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attention to various faults in his criticism. A well 
balanced review of his book, Saudi Arabia, in which 
his criticism was most systematic and forthrigiit, appeared 
in a Hiyadh based magazine : 
Inspite of such faults as we 
may find in the book, and in 
spite of anything that can 
possibly be said in the way of 
criticism or disagreement with 
the views expressed, there can 
be no doubt whatever thot a spirit 
of sincerity radiates from every 
line of it. And the book is rightly 
considered to be the most complete, 
well-balanced and serious book 
on Saudi Arabia yet published. To 
have written the last chapter and 
foreward alone should be a 
2 
sctisfaction enough for //ir. Philby. 
The last sentence is important. For it were the 
Si.16 two chapters in which Philby's disapproval of the 
1. The reviewer Wt,s the legal adviser to the Foreign 
Office of Soudi Arabia, His candour did not please 
the Gov'-rnment, As a result he was shifted to a minor post 
in the Finence department(See Philby, Forty years in 
the Wilderness op..cit. po7), 
2, As quoted in Philby, Forty Years in the Wilderness, op. 
cit. P. 7, 
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royal vagaries was forthright and unequivocal. It shows 
that there \vere persons, besides Philby, in the Kingdom 
wno shared Philby's feelirigs and h^ -d courage to support 
a right cause. Above all the reviewer, by singlingout 
the two chapters seems to justify Philby's criticism of 
financial mismanagement, corruption, extravagance and moral 
degradation caused by oil bonanza. For the two chapters, 
infact, are replete with similar accounts of Saudi affairs. 
Philby's complaints, specially about financial 
irregulc-rities and mismanagement during the reigns of 
Ibn Saud and his son Saud Ibn Abd al Aziz have been 
supported by other sources as well. Arthur N. Young who 
in 1951 was sent to Saudi Arabia by the United States as 
incharge of a financial mission at the request of king 
Ibn Saud, and who later on devised a central financial body, 
namely, the Saudi Arabian Monetry Agency, found after 
thorough investigation: that the State treasury was 
being treated as the King's personal purse. He very 
intelligently remarks that 'Governments, like individuals, 
have the urge to spend more whenever income suddenly 
increases. It was ouickly forgotten that up till 1939 
the government had managed with revenues equal to about 
$ 7 million yeorly. One might have ho^ed that income 
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of many tens of millions of dollars would prodOce a 
surplus for development and reserve. In this case, however, 
Parkinson's law did not mean merely that spending rose to 
the level of income. Rather, it rose to income plus borrowingr.. 
It took some time to cut the coat according to the cloth. 
Spending beyond income, and various excesses in spending, 
were not finally brought under control until Prince Faisal's 
reforms of the late 1950s, by which time he was heir 
apparent. 
Young has also given an account of social and 
religious conditions as prevalent in Saudi Arabia of early 
1950s, He seems to suggest that whereas the common people 
were deeply religious, some princes and a section of the 
richer class had adopted Western habits and way of living 
2 
such as drinking and piano-playing etcetera. Obiviously 
Young is not as bitter as Philby in his account of financial 
mismanagement and moral decadence in Saudi Arabia. However, 
they both have expressed similar views, the difference 
is not one of content but of methodology or way of presentation. 
1. Young, /vrthur N., Saudi Arabia; The Making of Financial 
Giant. New York, 1983, P. 22. 
2. See for details. Ibid. PP. 32-38o 
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In the preceding chapters we have discussed in 
detaij Philby's perception of Islam and the Arabs, Summ-
ing up the whole discussion we may draw the following 
conclusions. 
First- of all, Philby was an anti-imperialist. In 
his early youth he believed in orthodox Christianity and 
conservative ideals of politics. However, his mind undervent 
a change when he was doing his graduation at Cambridge. He 
began to doubt his religion, Christianity, and the ideals 
of imperialism. But it w. s only after his meeting with Ibn 
Saud that he espoused the cause of Arab independence.This 
espousal gradually brought him into open conflict with the 
British Government on its imperial policies in the Arab 
world. In Iraq and TransJordan he tried to promote the 
cause of Arab independence as a British civil servant. 
It appears that in the beginning he wanted some sort of 
arrangement between Britain and the Arab countries in 
order to help the latter stand on their feet. But when 
he failed in it he resigned from the government service 
and began to advocate complete freedom for the Arabs 
urging the British to quit their land which they had 
illegally occupied during and before the First World War, 
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After his resignation he assiduously worked for Arab 
independence and fought the nefarious designs of British 
irnDerialism, mainly through his speeches,articles and 
various books that he produced from time to time, 
Philby's anti-imperialism did not please the British 
but won him Arab admiration. However, his stand on Palestine 
problem proved an anathema for the Arabs including Ibn 
Saudo It seems that he had a soft corner for the persecuted 
Jews of-turope. The European Jews, no doubt, had a problem. 
But Philby's solution that the Arabs should free Palestine 
for them (the Jews) was bound to create more problems. 
Moreover it is silly and absurd to ask people to forsake 
their beloved homland in order to be inhabited by another 
people. All people have a special love for the land where 
they are born. So v^rere the Arabs of Palestine, Philby 
failed to understand this point when he asked Ibn Saud 
to agree with his plan which precisely meant to uproot 
the Palestinian Arabs for the sake of the JewSo 
Equally disturbing was Philby's stand on the Parti-
tion Plan which the Arabs had rejected outright, Philby 
criticised the Arab attitude saying that the plan to 
divide Pcilestine into separate Arab and Israeli states 
v;os favourable to th< Palestinians, for it gave greater 
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portion of the land to them, Infact his arguments were 
based on expediency rather than principles. On moral and 
legal ground the Arabs, he accepted, were right to 
reject the Plan, But since they were too weak to stop 
the Plan from being implemented by the determined and power-
ful Western naticns, its acceptance rather than rejectioi, 
he thought, would be advantagious to them. Infact the Arab 
case was based on reason, principle, sentiments and 
emotions which throb in the heart of every individual for 
his place of birth. Philby could not understand all these 
and advocated a solution (the Partition Plan) which was 
based on a purely political and commercial logic, hence 
failed to convince the ^rabs, 
Philby's perception of Islam is both negative and 
positive. Until 1930 or before he embraced Islam his attitude 
towards Islam was neither positive nor sympathetic. He 
was particularly disrespectful towards the Prophet and 
his Kinsmeno Moreover he committed many a mistake in his 
depiction (which is highly objective in some respects) of 
some Islamic practices owing either to his inability to 
understand them or his lack of background knowledge about 
the Wahhabee creed. Surprisingly he did not correct those 
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errors after his conversion to I^lam, However, his post 
conversion works are free from such mistakes. In these 
works Philby's attitude appears to be slightly changed. 
One may also call it a deliberate indifference on his part. 
Whatever the reason, it is crystal clear that his attitude 
towards Islam in his post conversion writings is sympa-
thetic, positive and objective to a great extent. 
Doubts have been raised about the sincerity or 
motive behind Philby's conversion to Islam. According 
to his critics his conversion was not spiritual but purely 
material. It is, however, difficult for us to say anything 
with certainty or to pass a judgement about his sincerity. 
Nor can we know his ulterior motives, if any, behind his 
conversion. What is, however, known to us and which can 
be stated safely is that he embraced Islam in 1930 and had 
been regular and punctual afterward in observing the 
prescribed Islamic practices. 
Philby's contribution to the discovery of oil in 
Saudi '^'•rc'ibia, specially in obtaining the oil concession 
for Aramco, Was commendably great. He was naturally happy 
to see the unprecedented prosperity that oil brought to 
Ar^'bia. However, he was disgu-sted with certain other 
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developments. First the oil bonaza brought about moral 
degradation, specially among the richer class and the 
royal princes. Their extravagance and addiction to 
Western ways and manners viore specially irksome for 
Philby. As a result he severely criticised the royal 
vagaries and mindless spending spree incurring the 
wrath of the Saudi Government which banished him from 
the country. Second, the fabulous wealth caused grave 
9 
financial mismanagemento The old system of finance or 
economy which Saudi Arabia had hitherto relied upon, 
crumbled under the weight of oil riches. And the Saudis 
could not adopt a new system immediately, for Ibn Saud and 
his people did not have fuller acquaintance with the 
intricacies of modern economic system. This softened 
Fhilby's attitude and as a result his criticism on this 
count is coupled with advice and suggestions such as 
modernizing the financial system and using the oil riches 
for public welfare rather than treating the State treasury 
as the King's personal purse. 
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